The Harris disposition

What kind of foreign policy would Kamala Harris pursue if she is elected president in November? Some commentators are pronouncing confidently on this question, but in truth even people close to the administration are not sure what Harris’ foreign policy would look like. At the presidential debate in September, the modest amount of foreign policy talk focused on Trump’s past missteps.

As the sitting vice president, no one can say Harris is unprepared for the international demands of being president. For three and a half years, she has received the President’s Daily Brief from the US intelligence community and attended meetings of the National Security Council. She has often represented the United States abroad, visiting 21 countries and meeting more than 150 world leaders.

However, she has not been a major player in the formulation of the Biden administration’s foreign policy.

It is way too early, therefore, to identify a “Harris doctrine”. However, drawing on her public statements, her record, and the people on whom she may depend, we can begin to discern a “Harris disposition”.

Harris’ principles

First, Harris identifies with the mainstream US tradition of American leadership abroad. At the Munich Security Conference in February, for instance, she said: “it is in the fundamental interest of the American people for the United States to fulfil our longstanding role of global leadership”.¹ At the Democratic National Convention (DNC) in August, she pledged to ensure “that America, not China, wins the competition for the twenty-first century, and that we strengthen, not abdicate, our global leadership”.²

By contrast, Trump defines America’s interests much more narrowly. As he once said: “I’m the president of the United States — I’m not the president of the globe.”³

Second, while Trump is sceptical of America’s alliances, Harris is an alliance believer. In the presidential debate, Harris said that US allies are thankful that Trump is “no longer president, and that we understand the importance of the greatest military alliance the world has ever known, which is NATO”.⁴ In June, she told the Summit on Peace in Ukraine that upholding rules and norms, defending democratic values, and standing with allies “makes America strong, and it keeps Americans safe”.⁵

Third, Harris’ belief in US leadership does not necessarily translate to a predilection for foreign interventions. In 2019, Harris told the Council on Foreign Relations that the United States’ biggest foreign policy mistake was “engaging in failed wars that have cost lives, destabilised the regions in which they have been fought, and undermined our leadership in the international community”.⁶ Notably, Harris supported Biden’s decision to withdraw completely from Afghanistan in 2021.⁷

In the debate, Harris noted proudly that for the first time this century “there is not one member of the United States military who is in active duty in a combat zone in any war zone around the world”.⁸ This is not the language of a hawk.

Fourth, Harris is more pro-trade than Trump — which isn’t saying that much. Trump has promised tariffs of 10 or even 20 per cent on all imports.⁹ At the debate, he claimed that “other countries are going to finally, after 75 years, pay us back for all that we’ve done for the world”. Harris called this plan a “Trump sales tax” on American consumers.¹⁰

In Harris’ 2019 presidential primary campaign, she said that Trump’s trade war was “crushing American farmers, killing American jobs, and punishing American consumers”.¹¹ But she also opposed or voted against free trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement due to their lack of environmental and labour protections. Her campaign has pledged to “employ targeted and strategic tariffs”.¹²

Fifth, Harris’ background as a lawyer and prosecutor may play into her approach to foreign policy. “Presidents’ approaches to foreign policy are inevitably shaped by their backgrounds,” a senior Biden administration official told me. “For example, former governors sometimes think that dealing with foreign leaders is akin to dealing with party bosses. Like UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Harris was a prosecutor. It’s notable that Harris has emphasised international law in her speeches.” Harris may well be more focused on human rights than Biden has been.

Sixth, it seems likely that Harris would hew closely to Biden in her approach to Europe. She has strong Europe policy foundations on which to build. Biden’s response to Russia’s brutal 2022 invasion of Ukraine was a successful exercise in statecraft and alliance management that has not only frustrated Putin’s aims and assisted Ukraine, but strengthened and expanded NATO. As vice president, Harris has visited Europe often and has spoken three times to the premier transatlantic forum, the Munich Security Conference. At the DNC, she vowed to “stand strong with Ukraine and our NATO allies”.¹³ At the debate, Harris said to Trump that Putin is a dictator “who would eat you for lunch”.¹⁴

Seventh, there would likely be a contrast between the Harris and Biden administrations when it comes to the Middle East. Harris called for an “immediate ceasefire” in Gaza in March, before other senior administration officials did so.¹⁵ It has been reported that she will probably conduct a full analysis of US–Israel policy if elected, and may be open to imposing conditions on some aid to Israel.¹⁶ However, her language on the conflict has been cautious, emphasising Israel’s right to defend itself. And while Harris can’t match Biden’s long and emotional connection with the country, in the debate she noted: “I have, my entire career and life, supported Israel and the Israeli people.”¹⁷

Finally, what about the other principal theatre of operations: the Indo-Pacific? The Biden administration has been unusually focused on Asia. Typically, Democratic administrations have been more seized of transatlantic relations than transpacific ones.

Unlike President Barack Obama, who initially seemed interested in pursuing a grand bargain with China, Biden has taken an “allies-first” approach to Asia. His administration has brought Japan and South Korea closer together, quickened America’s connections with India and Vietnam, stood up AUKUS, and convened both the Quad (the United States, Australia, Japan, and India) and the “Squad” (the United States, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines). At the same time, the administration has worked effectively to manage its strategic competition with China.

It is hard to say how much continuity we would see in Harris’ Asia policy. As vice president, Harris has visited seven Asian countries, including four of Washington’s five Asian treaty allies (Australia being the exception). How much of a priority would Asia be for Harris as president, though? “The Biden–Harris administration has deepened and strengthened Washington’s Asian alliances in historic ways, including AUKUS,” one senior administration official told me. “The question for a Harris–Walz administration is how to build on this and encourage more cooperation between the US and its allies, and between the allies themselves.”

Ultimately, the weight that a President Harris would put on Asia would depend on events — and personnel.

Harris’ people

In addition to Harris’ own disposition, the interests and inclinations of the people around her would be important. For example, Biden’s National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell have been critical to the success of President Biden’s Asia strategy.

Harris’ adviser Philip Gordon has her confidence and seems to be a lock for the role of National Security Adviser should she become president. Gordon was a colleague of mine at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC. He is a smart operator and a decent person; a listener who is open to persuasion. Gordon published a book in 2020 examining America’s repeated failures to bring about regime change in the Middle East. He is a cautious pragmatist, however, not an ideologue. He believed Obama should have bombed Syria after Assad crossed Washington’s red line, and opposed Biden’s decision to withdraw completely from Afghanistan in 2021.¹⁸

What about the key Cabinet positions? CIA Director Bill Burns is spoken of as a possible Secretary of State. Burns is a highly impressive player, a career foreign service officer who has been responsible for the administration’s shadow diplomacy in recent years. Alternatively, Harris could choose a former senator, governor, or Cabinet officer — the current Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, for example, or Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg.

If Lloyd Austin were not asked to stay on at the Pentagon for a year or two, as some rumours have it, Harris may choose to appoint the first female Secretary of Defence. There are several strong candidates, including former Undersecretary of Defence Michèle Flournoy, Army Secretary Christine Wormuth, and Deputy Secretary of Defence Kathleen Hicks. There are many other elected officials and high-profile individuals with expertise on defence, including Senator Jack Reed.

Finally, Harris’ running mate, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz, would bring to the administration an unusual association with China for a top-tier American politician. Walz has visited the country some 30 times since he taught English in Guangdong province after university.¹⁹ He is knowledgeable about China and affectionate towards the Chinese people. On the other hand, when he was a member of the US House of Representatives, Walz was an outspoken critic of China’s trade practices and human rights abuses.²⁰ It would be interesting to see what role a Vice President Walz plays in foreign relations in general, and on the China file in particular.

The stakes for Australia

What would a Harris presidency mean for Australia?

Harris’ mainstream outlook on foreign policy means that she would be more in tune with Australians’ instincts than Trump would be. Trump is sympathetic to isolationism; Australians are inclined towards internationalism. Trump is viscerally hostile towards free trade; Australia is a trading nation.

Given that AUKUS is one of the Biden–Harris administration’s notable foreign policy achievements, it seems highly unlikely that Harris as president would walk away from it. On the other hand, Trump has no personal stake in AUKUS and in the past he has been happy to renege on deals made by his predecessors.

If Harris is elected, she would gel with Anthony Albanese. The two have met several times and have a warm relationship. There are some similarities between California liberals and members of the New South Wales Labor Left. At a lunch Harris hosted for Albanese at the State Department in October 2023, she emphasised their similar views on the rights of Indigenous people, the LGBTQ+ community, and workers.

What if Peter Dutton were to become prime minister at the next election? Prime Minister Dutton and President Harris would have less in common on domestic issues. On the other hand, Dutton’s muscular approach to defence, and his instinctive pro-American position, would appeal to any US president.

We cannot really know what foreign policies Kamala Harris would advance as president. Speeches delivered at think tank conferences and party conventions rarely translate into decisions taken in office. If elected, developments abroad will be crucial. Given that foreign policy is not Harris’ chief interest, the instincts of her key advisers will be unusually important.

However, we can say that the Harris disposition fits within the mainstream of US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. The Trump disposition does not.

Dr Michael Fullilove AM is the Executive Director of the Lowy Institute.