Harris and China: Competition and antagonism, continued

During the 2020 US election campaign, Beijing considered whether it should surreptitiously attempt to interfere in the contest by putting a thumb on the scale on behalf of either of the two candidates, Donald Trump or Joe Biden.

In the end, Beijing didn’t bother, according to a new book by David Sanger, the longtime New York Times national security reporter, because the leadership concluded “there was no prospect for a pro-China administration” whatever the outcome.¹

This time around, has China’s interference calculus changed in an election pitting Kamala Harris, the vice president and Democratic candidate, against Trump? In other words, does China care that much about who will win?

Beijing prefers a Harris win, but only just

Beijing probably fears a Trump victory more than the alternative because of the Republican candidate’s sheer manic unpredictability. But Chinese leaders have likely reached a similar conclusion in 2024 as they did four years earlier: interfering in the contest wouldn’t be worth the trouble.

In the words of Zhao Minghao, a professor of the Institute of International Studies and Center for American Studies at Fudan University, quoted in the Financial Times: “Trump and Kamala Harris are two bowls of poison for Beijing. Both see China as a competitor or even an adversary.”²

In many respects, Harris is a blank slate on China policy, just as she is on foreign policy more broadly.

But President Joe Biden’s administration, in which she has largely faithfully served for nearly four years, and the Democratic Party constituencies that Harris has emerged from, have a substantial hinterland on China.

Steady as she goes

The Biden administration’s policy has eschewed old notions of engagement and instead adopted a stance of competing on all fronts: regional, economic, military, and technological. In terms of regional diplomacy, the Biden administration has focused on tightening ties with allies — especially Japan, the Philippines, and Australia — and engaging new partners, such as India.

There is no suggestion that Harris has plans to substantially change this approach. In fact, her public comments on China thus far reflect that policy. In a speech at the Economic Club of Pittsburgh, Harris said the United States should lead “the world in the industries of the future, making sure America, not China, wins the competition for the twenty-first century”.³

In any case, whatever Harris thinks, even given the power of the presidency, it would have to be balanced against the rest of Washington, which is almost uniformly wary, suspicious, and often outright hostile towards Beijing. Neither Congress, the national security bureaucracy, nor the military are likely to offer Harris many options that would allow her to radically change direction, nor are there any signs she wants to.

“Harris appears to be signaling that she is committed to ensuring America outperforms China and continues to lead,” said Ryan Hass, a former Obama administration China adviser, in a post on X, the social media site. “She views self-strengthening at home, coordination with allies, and hard-nosed diplomacy as essential to the task.”⁴

As Hass notes, Harris has been involved in policy discussions and intelligence briefings relating to China for the past four years. She has met with the leaders of all five US treaty allies in Asia (Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia) and visited all but Australia.

Harris’ efforts to paint Trump as soft on China have not always hit their mark. In their only one-on-one debate, Harris accused Trump of shipping “advanced semi-conductor chips to China, which helps them upgrade their military”.

Trump pointed out, correctly, that most of the chips were made in Taiwan, by TSMC, the world’s largest semi-conductor manufacturer, albeit often with US intellectual property.

The extensive China experience of Tim Walz, Harris’ running mate, both as a young teacher in China and then later in building commercial ties as Minnesota governor, has also been examined for clues of a Harris administration China policy.

Walz’s experience may make him useful as an occasional envoy too, if such a role is envisaged. Certainly, Walz was firmly in the “engagement” school of China policy as governor, which put him in the mainstream at the time.

But prior experience with China does not translate into support for China, despite campaign attacks to the contrary from Republicans. Walz, after all, has made a point of commemorating the brutal military crackdown of 4 June 1989 in Beijing and elsewhere.

A Harris administration, then, is likely to pursue a steady-as-she-goes policy towards Beijing. Given the mutual antagonism between the two countries, that means relations won’t be steady at all.

Richard McGregor is the Senior Fellow for East Asia at the Lowy Institute.