Harris and the Pacific Islands: Delivering on a Pacific vision

In the whirlwind of speeches to cement Kamala Harris’ presidential credentials, the Pacific Islands have hardly rated a mention, but on critical regional issues relating to existential climate threats and hard economic times, a Harris win bodes better than a Trump triumph.

The Pacific hope for Harris is that she will deliver on promises made in the Pacific Partnership Strategy, the two Pacific Islands–US summits (2022 and 2023), and the many diplomatic visits under President Biden. The question is: What will her administration do better, or differently?

The climate crisis and rising insecurity

Climate change is the top security issue in Pacific Island countries. There is an urgent need to act, with a recent UN report providing scientific evidence of increasing Pacific climate vulnerability.¹ The Democratic Party’s 2024 platform recognises the climate crisis as “an existential threat” and commits to enhanced global climate leadership, but Harris has provided few details.

When pressed during the campaign, she promised to “tackle the climate crisis with bold action to build a clean energy economy, advance environmental justice, and increase resilience to climate disasters”.² Pacific leaders expect her to honour the Biden administration commitments to support climate adaptation and mobilise climate finance, including Harris’ own 2023 pledge to boost US funding to the Green Climate Fund by US$3 billion.³

One area where Harris will stand firm is security. Despite US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell’s “hot mic” comments in August about “giving the [policing] lane” to Australia, the United States is sidestepping, not walking away.⁴ Defence diplomacy has been booming since the 2022 Solomon Islands–China security deal, and there are no signs it will slow down while China is knocking at the Pacific Islands’ door.⁵ The US Defence Department is ramping up bilateral ship rider agreements, security training, and equipment provision.

Any wavering by the West on climate, security, or development commitments will be exploited by China, and Pacific Island countries will leverage all sides to survive.

Summits promise big, but are yet to deliver

The two Pacific Islands–US summits under the Biden administration, as well as the US-initiated Partners in the Blue Pacific, promised big. The summits alone committed more than US$1 billion to resilience, regionalism, and sustainable development. A Harris administration is likely to honour pledges to increase the US diplomatic and development footprint in the Pacific.

Still, Harris has a lot of ground to make up, given decades of near absence in the South Pacific. Kurt Campbell admitted that “there have been periods where we have not been as deeply engaged as we should have been”.⁶ Harris’ views on foreign aid are not clearly articulated.

Excepting the US Compact states (Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Palau), the United States is not a top aid and trade partner in the Pacific. In countries such as Papua New Guinea, there is concern that US interest is too focused on geopolitics and strategic issues to the detriment of Pacific development priorities. To maintain credibility, a Harris administration would need to open more economic and social development opportunities.

One critical area is health security, clearly outlined in the 2024 Pacific Islands Forum Leaders’ Declaration. The Democratic Party’s commitment to the World Health Organization (WHO) augurs well, in contrast to the previous Trump administration’s withdrawal from the WHO during the pandemic. Even so, coordinated US action for health gains has room to improve.⁷

Regional realities and rivalries

Some regional commitments of high importance are locked in, whoever takes the oath of office in January. The US Senate has approved more than US$7 billion for Compact states over 20 years to assist with infrastructure and development in exchange for US military access and exclusivity. New embassies have been established in the region, and finances to support summit commitments approved.

But a Harris administration can’t coast.

There is a resentment about US deportees to the Pacific Islands who are associated with violent crimes and the drug trade. Emotions are also running high on the failure of all sides of American politics to take action on the US nuclear weapons testing legacy. Harris has been silent on these issues, but the Pacific Islands will keep pushing for justice.

Greater US engagement is welcome, but not geopolitical rivalries that reduce development options. The 2022 US National Security Strategy aims to “effectively compete with the People’s Republic of China”.⁸ Harris needs to clarify how this will translate in a region eager to remain “friends to all”, China included.⁹

Pulling together

With so many pressures on the United States for global engagement, leveraging strategic partnerships with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and others in the Pacific Islands will be essential. The Democrats have a better track record than their opponents on Pacific collaboration, especially for delivering enhanced connectivity and critical infrastructure. However, more innovation is needed to tailor actions to Pacific development needs.

The United States has the assets to deepen people-to-people relations, and to strengthen government, business, and civil society networks. In the words of a Pacific Islands senior official in Canberra, “it is not only about US dollars, what we need is US relationships that are deep and enduring”. The Biden administration did the diplomatic courting, put words on the policy page, and splashed cash. Harris needs to have a Pacific policy vision and show she can deliver.

Dr Meg Keen is Senior Research Fellow in the Pacific Islands Program.