Trump would put personality over policy in the Middle East

A recent New York Times editorial weighing Donald Trump’s suitability for a second presidential term aptly observed how, instead of being driven by a cogent vision for America’s future, Trump’s desire to come back to power is above all motivated by three things: “to use the levers of government to advance his interests, satisfy his impulses, and exact retribution against those who he thinks have wronged him”.¹ By adapting this prism, we can also begin to sketch a second Trump administration’s approach to the Middle East.

Impulses

Trump’s overarching impulse towards the region can be boiled down to the following: look strong, but don’t do too much. For a region notorious for its complexity and intractability, this is not necessarily a bad approach. It could save the United States from further catastrophic and misguided follies, like the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In many ways, this approach would also represent a continuation of America’s “hegemonic retreat” from the region — a dynamic that predates Trump.²

However, “looking strong” is not the same thing as exercising regional leadership. Nor does a less involved United States mean more stability in the Middle East. Far from ushering in a period of benign neglect, a re-elected Donald Trump is more likely to expand a vacuum in the Middle East that demands to be filled. The region is already subject to the alternative designs of Iran, Russia, and China, among others.

This would sharpen the calculations of every US ally including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel. These players have already hedged against US retreat, and are bracing for the possibility that US adversaries will have freer rein under a second Trump presidency. This may continue positive developments, such as deepening the China-brokered détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia, or it may intensify interregional competition, particularly if the US–Saudi security agreement comes through.

More problems may arise when Trump’s impulse to look strong leads to incoherent and risky policies, such as his first administration’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, which has only served to accelerate Iran’s production of uranium enriched to near-weapons grade levels.³ Similarly, the US assassination of General Soleimani, the commander of the Iranian Quds Force, in Baghdad in 2020 was an ill-considered decision that kicked off a round of escalatory violence.⁴ This same impulsiveness would likely continue to govern any future Trump administration’s regional approach, for example, when dealing with the problem of Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

While Trump’s impulsiveness and unpredictability offer little comfort to US regional allies, his actions are not entirely beneficial for adversaries either. Trump’s capricious tendencies could also make it more dangerous for Tehran and its regional proxies to agitate against US interests in the region.

Personal interests

With Trump back in office, the national interest would almost certainly come to be defined in much narrower terms. US Middle East policy will be pursued first and foremost to serve the self-interest of the president, rather than the United States as a nation or the wider interests of a broad network of allies. This may mean that US policy drivers towards a key strategic partner such as Saudi Arabia will be governed more by the Trump Organization’s real estate development plans in Jeddah.⁵ Or, given his propensity to flattery, decisions will be swayed by Trump’s personal relations with the regional leaders who do best at fanning his ego.

It is also in Trump’s interests to be seen as a dealmaker. The first Trump term did bring the Abraham Accords. Whether this diplomatic breakthrough was due to Trump’s talents as a dealmaker or those of his son-in-law turned mediator Jared Kushner, or merely a formalisation of discreetly growing ties between Israel and the UAE in years prior is up for debate.⁶ But a second Trump administration would be keen to burnish this legacy and lock down the next phase of the Abraham Accords, which aims at normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia, a goal that was also doggedly pursued by the Biden administration.

However, Trump’s dealmaking would likely stop at the most intractable regional conflict of all. The Israel–Hamas war has no upside for Trump, and even accounting for his inflated assessment of himself, Trump seems sufficiently self-aware not to claim he can resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. While Trump has been a strong supporter of Israel in the past, he has stated repeatedly that the war in Gaza must end quickly and has more recently been lukewarm at best towards Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Nevertheless, Trump will have no sympathy towards the Palestinian movement and is unlikely to place further pressure on Israel regarding the prosecution of this war.

Retribution

Lastly, beyond Trump’s direct interests and impulses, what will impact US statecraft in the Middle East is his desire for broader retribution against the so-called deep state, otherwise known as the functioning US government bureaucracy.

Much has been made of Project 2025, a tome published by the Heritage Foundation that purports to offer a blueprint for a second Trump term.⁷ In reality, it is little more than a grab bag of longstanding, and at times contradictory, libertarian and conservative positions. Some of what is laid out in these papers accords with his stated objectives: cutting funding for government agencies, eroding their authority, and ensuring there are no functioning executive agencies to blunt his agenda. A re-elected Trump would also likely make significant cuts to the US foreign aid budget, which would have serious implications for countries such as Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Cutting off funding to UNRWA, the UN humanitarian and development agency operating in Gaza and the West Bank, seems a near certainty.

A likely purge of the US federal government also means that, outside of Trump’s coterie of advisers and loyalists, there may be very little institutional expertise left on US Middle East foreign policy. This time around, there would be far fewer “adults in the room”.

Lydia Khalil is Director of the Transnational Challenges program at the Lowy Institute.