Trump has clashing instincts on Asian security, but China competition will continue

Trump’s first-term record in Asia was less radical than promised. He ended US involvement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal, and his overtures to North Korea strayed far from Washington policy norms. Yet despite three summits with Kim Jong-un, the fundamentals of American policy on the peninsula remained untouched. And despite expressing regular frustration with allies, Trump did not oversee major reductions in US military commitments in Asia.

The lack of progress in implementing Trump’s instincts was partly a result of his own inability to drive change, but also due to resistance from his senior advisers. In a second Trump administration, that resistance will probably decline because he will choose senior officials closer to his own worldview.

Primacists, prioritisers, and restrainers

Yet Trump’s foreign policy instincts will not go unchallenged. The US analyst Jeremy Shapiro divides the senior officials likely to shape Trump’s national security policy into three tribes: primacists, prioritisers, and restrainers.¹

The primacists are led by former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and they argue for continued global strength and leadership. The prioritiser school is exemplified by Elbridge Colby, a senior defence official in Trump’s first term whose book, The Strategy of Denial, calls for America to reduce its commitments to Europe and the Middle East to focus on the China threat. Trump’s running mate, JD Vance, could also be counted in this school.²

Finally, the restrainers are interested primarily in economic competition with China, not geopolitics. They want America to wind back its global military commitments. Trump himself is the leading member of this tribe, though his first-term record does not reflect consistent adherence to its principles.

Which tribe will be ascendant in a second Trump administration? We can assume none will be decisive. Ideological and policy tribalism is a feature of every presidency, and senior advisers always compete for influence. A new Trump team would be no different.

One thing seems pre-ordained because all three tribes want it: an escalation of economic and technological competition with China. But in service of what policy? Here the tribes disagree. While the restrainers are uninterested in security competition with China, the primacists and prioritisers aim to weaken China so that the United States can win a regional security contest.

AUKUS and alliance scepticism

It is unclear where the three tribes stand on AUKUS, under which Australia will get as many as five Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). US shipbuilding may not be able to ramp up quickly enough to meet demand from both the US Navy and Australia, and this has caused consternation in the Trump camp. Elbridge Colby has tweeted: “SSNs are our jewel in the crown and we have too few. It would be highly imprudent to part with them absent an ironclad guarantee they can be employed at the will of the United States.”³

But Colby’s position on AUKUS appears to have softened, and when former Prime Minister Scott Morrison met with Donald Trump in May, he told reporters afterwards that “There was a welcome level of comfort about AUKUS in our discussion”.⁴ Defence Minister Richard Marles has heard similar signals: “Every engagement we’ve had with the Trump camp … there is support for what is playing out in relation to AUKUS.”

Yet on AUKUS, as with his approach to Asian geopolitics more generally, we must not discount Trump’s impulsiveness and volatility, as well as a lifelong public antipathy to America’s alliances.

America’s military forces in Asia — 79,000 active-duty military personnel in Japan and South Korea, plus major force elements in Hawaii, Guam, and elsewhere — are formidable. But their power comes only partly through their military capabilities. It also comes through the American president’s willingness to use it.

Trump’s reticence in this regard is well known. He has consistently questioned why Americans should make sacrifices for the defence of its allies, including Japan and South Korea. In January, he declined an opportunity to commit America to the defence of Taiwan.⁵ In February, he said he would encourage Russia to attack NATO unless its members increased their defence spending. As president, he refused to give a speech referring to America’s unwavering commitment to Article 5 of the NATO treaty.⁶ And he excoriated his own generals and senior advisers when they tried to school him on why America needed to defend the rules-based international order.⁷

Allies will invest in self-defence

This may encourage China to behave more boldly on Taiwan or its territorial claims in the South China Sea. It may also encourage Washington’s allies to go further in ensuring their own defence. Japan has announced a doubling of defence spending, and South Korea is investing in its own non-nuclear strategic deterrent force.⁸ This is not just a response to Trump but to a 30-year erosion of America’s military predominance. Since China launched its military modernisation drive in the early 1990s, US force levels in Asia have remained roughly constant.

Trump is unlikely to reverse that trend — whether the primacists, prioritisers, or restrainers win the battle for Trump’s attention, there is no prospect of US military predominance being restored. A more achievable goal would be to settle for a balance of power with China, but whether that will satisfy the ambitions of the tribes is an open question.

Sam Roggeveen is Director of the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute.