- Global attention is often focused on Taiwan’s dwindling diplomatic partners, which have dropped to just 11 UN member states, mostly small Caribbean and Pacific Island countries. But what matters more is the growing global support for China’s efforts to bring Taiwan under its control, potentially via the use of force.
- Only 40 countries (21 per cent of UN member states) maintain one-China policies that recognise the government in Beijing but stop short of accepting China’s sovereignty over the de facto independent territory of Taiwan. These countries “take note of”, “acknowledge”, or “respect” (all without outright endorsing) Beijing’s claim that Taiwan is part of China.
- By contrast, nearly three-quarters of countries (74 per cent or 142 in total) now support Beijing’s position that Taiwan is part of China, though a number of these (23) have declined to also endorse Beijing’s preferred one-China principle.
- A majority of countries (119 or 62 per cent of UN member states) have endorsed Beijing’s one-China principle, which entails that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the People’s Republic of China.
- Of those, 89 countries (nearly half of UN member states) have combined their endorsement of Beijing’s one-China principle with support for its efforts to “achieve national reunification”. Crucially, they have done so without specifying that these efforts should be peaceful, arguably consenting to Beijing using force to take control of Taiwan.
Introduction
As diplomatic stances on Taiwan become more contested and consequential, this world-first dataset details every UN member state’s position on the governments in Taipei and Beijing. It offers an original framework for understanding the range of stances and provides a globally comprehensive picture of the state of international diplomacy on Taiwan’s status.
Taiwan sits astride one of the sharpest fault lines in world politics. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is determined to bring the self-governing island under its control. President Xi Jinping has declared that “[r]esolving the Taiwan question and realising China’s complete reunification is … a historic mission and an unshakable commitment”.1 Pitted against Beijing’s determination and buttressed by US military support, an overwhelming majority of the Taiwanese public want to preserve Taiwan’s de facto independence.2 Amidst these titanic forces colliding across the Taiwan Strait, no country is insulated from the complex and sometimes bruising diplomacy of managing formal and informal ties with Beijing and Taipei.
In November 2021, a Taiwanese Representative Office was established in Vilnius with the Lithuanian government’s permission. The Office did not use the PRC’s preferred nomenclature of Taipei Economic and Cultural Office. This seemingly innocuous decision set off a diplomatic firestorm that torched bilateral ties between the PRC and Lithuania. As well as ambassadors being recalled, the Chinese government targeted Lithuania with coercive economic measures.3 Beijing even imposed some informal secondary sanctions against international companies that depended on the Lithuanian market.4 More than three years later, bilateral ties between Vilnius and Beijing remain testy, and these tensions have emerged as an enduring strain on relations between China and the European Union.
This is just one example of the fierce global diplomatic contest over the complex status of Taiwan. In addition to longstanding PRC efforts to chip away at the dwindling number of countries that maintain state-to-state ties with the government in Taipei, Beijing is garnering more support for its claimed sovereignty over Taiwan.5 The Chinese government is also successfully pressuring and persuading more countries to endorse PRC efforts to take control of Taiwan, potentially via the use of force.6 All the while, Taipei is fighting a rearguard battle to maintain and expand its ties with the world, both via state-to-state relations and political, business, cultural, and other connections.
A typology of one-China positions
According to the typology developed here, all countries fall into one of five broad categories based on whether they recognise the governments in Taipei or Beijing and key differences in their level of support for the PRC’s position on Taiwan (see Table 1).
| Team Taipei | Status Quo-ists | Mixed Signallers | Beijing Leaners | Beijing Backers | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Recognise the government in Taipei | |||||
| Recognise the government in Beijing | |||||
| Endorse China’s sovereignty over Taiwan | |||||
| Endorse the PRC’s one-China principle | |||||
Support PRC efforts to “achieve national reunification”7 | |||||
| Number of UN member states | 11 | 40 | 23 | 30 | 89 |
Category 1 Team Taipei
Category one consists of the countries dubbed Team Taipei, which retain state-to-state ties with the government in Taipei and thereby do not recognise the PRC or endorse its sovereignty over Taiwan. Most of the 11 UN member states8 in category one are economically, demographically, and geographically small, with a majority of them Caribbean and Pacific Island countries.
Category 2 Status Quo-ists
The 40 countries in category two recognise the government in Beijing, but do not endorse the PRC’s one-China principle and instead maintain one-China policies (see Table 2). These countries “take note of”, “acknowledge”, or “respect” Beijing’s claim that Taiwan is part of China, but stop short of explicitly endorsing this PRC position. Countries in category two are concentrated in Europe, North America, and East Asia but they are found around the globe. These Status Quo-ists include both great and emerging powers such as the United States and India, as well as a wide range of major, middle, and small powers, such as Japan, Australia, and Trinidad and Tobago. Although not numerically the largest category, the Status Quo-ists are arguably still the most powerful global grouping. Together, they account for more than 50 per cent of global GDP and total world military spending.
Category 3 Mixed Signallers
Like the Status Quo-ists in category two, the 23 Mixed Signallers in category three recognise the PRC as part of one-China policies and decline to endorse Beijing’s one-China principle. But unlike the Status Quo-ists, the Mixed Signallers affirm China’s sovereignty over Taiwan.9 Although found around the globe, including in Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, many of the countries in category three are economically, geographically, and demographically smaller, and less internationally influential (notable exceptions include France).
Categories 4 and 5 Beijing Leaners and Beijing Backers
The 119 countries in categories four and five support to varying degrees the PRC position on Taiwan. The Beijing Leaners in category four endorse the one-China principle and affirm China’s sovereignty over Taiwan. As well as taking these two positions, the Beijing Backers in category five support PRC efforts to “achieve national reunification” without specifying that these efforts should be peaceful, arguably consenting to the PRC using force to take control of Taiwan. Although a large portion of the Beijing Leaners and Backers are in Africa (every African nation except Eswatini is a Beijing Backer), states in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and the Pacific are also in these categories. The countries in categories four and five tend to have developing economies and are concentrated in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.
One‑China policies10 |
|
The PRC’s one‑China principle |
|
Analysis
Global polarisation and advantage Beijing
The global distribution of these five categories reveals a divided international community. Nearly half of UN member states (46 per cent) fall into the most pro-Beijing category (category five), while 40 countries (21 per cent) fall into category two, which declines to endorse the Chinese government’s one-China principle, China’s sovereignty over Taiwan, or the PRC’s efforts to take control of the island (see Figure 1). With the two largest groups of countries taking vastly different approaches to Taiwan and the PRC, the international community is clearly polarised.
UN member states by category
Team Taipei
Status Quo-ists
Mixed Signallers
Beijing Leaners
Beijing Backers
The results nevertheless reveal majority support for the PRC position on Taiwan (see Figure 1). Some 62 per cent of UN member states (119 countries in categories four and five) have endorsed the PRC’s one-China principle and affirmed China’s sovereignty over Taiwan. This outnumbers the Status Quo-ists and Mixed Signallers combined by nearly two-to-one and is close to 11 times the size of Team Taipei.
Debunking the PRC’s “universal consensus” on Taiwan
Despite having the preponderance of countries on its side, Beijing’s claim that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China” is far from a “universal consensus of the international community”.17 In addition to the 11 countries in category one that maintain formal ties with the government in Taipei,18 the 40 countries in category two have declined to endorse Beijing’s position that Taiwan is part of China. Overall, approximately 26 per cent of UN member states do not take the PRC’s view (see Figure 2).
UN member states and the PRC’s position that Taiwan is part of China
Endorse the PRC’s
position that Taiwan is part of China
Decline to endorse the PRC’s position that Taiwan is part of China
The PRC also regularly makes deceptive claims about the extent of support for its one-China principle.19 Beijing has said, for example, that “181 countries … have established diplomatic relations with China on the basis of the one-China principle”.20 But even the 23 Mixed Signallers in category three decline to endorse the one-China principle. Thailand and Malaysia, for example, “recognise” that Taiwan is part of China and yet continue to state their commitment to a one-China policy rather than the PRC’s one-China principle.21 Some 74 countries (38 per cent of UN member states in categories one, two, and three) have not endorsed Beijing’s one-China principle (see Figure 3). This falls well short of making the one-China principle the “universal consensus of the international community” that the PRC claims.22
UN member states and the PRC’s one-China principle
Endorse PRC’s
one-China principle
Decline to endorse PRC’s one-China principle
The international embrace of PRC language
The above data does, however, reveal widespread support for the PRC’s position on Taiwan. In total, 119 countries (62 per cent of UN member states) endorse Beijing’s one-China principle and affirm China’s sovereignty over Taiwan (see Figure 3). Moreover, increasingly strong support for Beijing’s position on Taiwan is a common feature of recent joint communiqués between the PRC and many of its diplomatic partners.23 An especially conspicuous example of this trend is a growing number of statements of support for all PRC efforts to “achieve national reunification” or to leave out any qualification that Beijing’s objectives should be pursued peacefully.24 In September 2024, for example, 53 African states25 expressed their firm support for “all efforts by the Chinese government to achieve national reunification”.26 Globally, 89 countries have combined their endorsement of Beijing’s one-China principle with what appears to be unqualified support for PRC efforts to “achieve national reunification”.27 This equates to approximately 46 per cent of all UN member states (see Figure 4).
UN member states and the PRC’s one-China principle and efforts to “achieve national reunification”
Endorse both the one-China principle and support PRC efforts to “achieve national reunification”
Decline to endorse the one-
China principle and support PRC efforts to “achieve national reunification”
The implications of the growing number of countries expressing support for PRC efforts to “achieve national reunification” are open to debate. But considering that “national reunification” on the Chinese government’s terms would entail Beijing’s control over Taiwan and an end to its de facto independence, it is plausible to conclude that nearly half of UN member states have, intentionally or not, formally endorsed a PRC takeover of the island.28 Of note, this proportion only includes those UN member states that have expressed support for PRC efforts to “achieve national reunification” without stipulating that these efforts should be peaceful, and a subset of those have stated that they support all PRC efforts. It remains to be seen precisely how these countries would respond if the PRC sought to take Taiwan by violent military means. It is nevertheless likely that in such conflict scenarios the PRC would seek to portray these countries as having given the green light for its use of force.
Beijing is winning without fighting
This dataset paints a bleak picture for Taipei and those capitals in favour of preserving the cross-Strait status quo of a de facto independent Taiwan. As of 1 January 2025, 142 countries (74 per cent of UN member states) have affirmed that Taiwan is part of China, 119 countries (62 per cent of UN member states) have endorsed the PRC’s one-China principle, and 95 countries (49 per cent of UN member states) support PRC efforts to “achieve national reunification” (see Table 3).
| Position | Number of UN member states | |
|---|---|---|
| Recognise the government in Beijing
(categories two, three, four, and five) | 182 | 94% |
| Endorse China’s sovereignty over Taiwan
(categories three, four, and five) | 142 | 74% |
| Endorse the PRC’s one-China principle
(categories four and five) | 119 | 62% |
| Support PRC efforts to “achieve national reunification”
(category five plus six countries from category three) | 95 | 49% |
In the decade to 1 January 2025, Taipei lost ten diplomatic partners, all of which went on to endorse the PRC’s one-China principle. As Beijing steps up its efforts to win over Taipei’s remaining diplomatic partners, the number of countries with state-to-state ties with Taiwan is likely to continue falling. Already, 182 countries (94 per cent of UN member states; see Table 3) recognise the PRC, and this number will probably rise, especially with Beijing sustaining its considerable efforts to flip Taipei’s remaining diplomatic partners, including Eswatini, Guatemala, and Palau, among others.29 Worse still for Taipei, Beijing is also likely to continue persuading its diplomatic partners to issue stronger endorsements of various aspects of the PRC position on Taiwan.30
It is unclear what impact on Beijing’s calculus, if any, the international adoption of various aspects of the PRC position on Taiwan will have. Isolating Taipei internationally and normalising the PRC perspective might make military conflict less likely by giving Beijing more confidence in its ability to achieve its goal of control over Taiwan via non-violent means. The PRC might be less tempted to use force if Beijing believes its control over Taiwan could become an international fait accompli via diplomatic means.
Equally, however, the PRC’s successful diplomatic strategy could be a prelude to war. The PRC might be aiming to create an international environment in which most countries are committed to its view of Taiwan, and global resistance to an attack across the Strait is thereby minimised. If that is the case, Beijing’s push to formally sign countries up to its preferred language might be motivated by recognition of the influence of diplomacy in conflict scenarios.31
Regardless of Beijing’s intentions, the growing global embrace of the one-China principle and other aspects of the PRC position on Taiwan is likely to influence the international politics of cross-Strait security. Just as the widespread adoption of Beijing’s stance towards Taipei might constrain US-led efforts at collective deterrence, it could provide the PRC with extra licence to escalate military aggression against Taiwan.
Appendices
Appendix 1: Methodology and sources
The typology developed for this analysis allows every UN member state to be sorted into distinct categories that capture key differences in their level of support for the PRC position on Taiwan.
The dataset mostly uses primary source evidence. The preferred sources of data are authoritative joint statements and communiqués between the PRC and other countries. Where these are unavailable, other official government statements and media readouts of meetings have been used. Although extensive efforts have been made to find a range of authoritative sources for every country, the enormous number of potential datapoints in a wide range of different languages means that not all relevant sources of evidence are captured in this dataset.
Neither the categories nor the aggregated data represent a complete account of the diverse elements of every country’s position on Taiwan. For example, countries in category two decline to affirm China’s sovereignty over Taiwan in a wide variety of ways, including by, among other linguistic formulations, “taking note of”, “acknowledging”, and “respecting” (all without supporting) the Chinese government’s stance.32 Likewise, many of the countries in categories two to five have at different times used various formulations to say, among other things, that they do not support or even oppose Taiwanese independence.33
Given the nuanced and technical language used by countries to articulate their positions on Taiwan, inconsistencies are liable to feature even in official government statements. For example, despite Slovenia recognising the PRC as part of a one-China policy and having endorsed Beijing’s view that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory”, the Slovenian Prime Minister in an interview in January 2022 referred to Taiwan as a country rather than as part of China.34 Inconsistent messaging abounds from a variety of countries.
Such inconsistencies also exist regarding many countries’ positions on the PRC’s one-China principle, sovereignty over Taiwan, and efforts to “achieve national reunification”. Where such inconsistencies exist, care has been taken to attribute to each country the most plausible and internally consistent version of their positions. But due to incomplete and conflicting data, the characterisations of some countries’ positions are open to debate and competing interpretations.
Given the PRC’s record of misrepresenting other countries’ positions on Taiwan,35 this dataset uses, where possible, other governments’ statements and readouts of meetings rather than those produced by Beijing. Where these are unavailable and the only record is from the Chinese government, the dataset makes this clear. All practicable efforts have been made to fact-check datapoints based on questionable or conflicting sources. This includes directly contacting various governments to clarify their positions. Although this dataset and analysis reflect the international situation as of 1 January 2025, positions taken by countries on Taiwan’s status are dynamic and will likely continue shifting.
Appendix 2: UN member states by category
| Category 1: Team Taipei | 11 UN member states |
|---|---|
| Belize | Eswatini |
| Guatemala | Haiti |
| Marshall Islands | Palau |
| Paraguay | Saint Kitts and Nevis |
| Saint Lucia | Saint Vincent and the Grenadines |
| Tuvalu | |
| Category 2: Status Quo-ists | 40 UN member states |
| Afghanistan | Argentina |
| Australia | Austria |
| Barbados | Belgium |
| Bhutan | Brunei |
| Canada | Cyprus |
| Denmark | Finland |
| Greece | Guyana |
| Iceland | India |
| Ireland | Italy |
| Jamaica | Japan |
| Lebanon | Liechtenstein |
| Luxembourg | Malta |
| Monaco | Netherlands |
| New Zealand | Norway |
| Oman | Philippines |
| Qatar | San Marino |
| South Korea | Spain |
| Sweden | Switzerland |
| Trinidad and Tobago | Türkiye |
| United Kingdom | United States |
| Category 3: Mixed Signallers | 23 UN member states |
| Albania | Andorra |
| Armenia | Bahamas |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | Czechia |
| Estonia | France |
| Germany | Jordan |
| Lithuania | Malaysia |
| Montenegro | Myanmar |
| North Macedonia | Poland |
| Romania | Singapore |
| Slovakia | Slovenia |
| Thailand | Ukraine |
| Vietnam | |
| Category 4: Beijing Leaners | 30 UN member states |
| Antigua and Barbuda | Bahrain |
| Bangladesh | Brazil |
| Bulgaria | Chile |
| Costa Rica | Croatia |
| Dominican Republic | Georgia |
| Grenada | Honduras |
| Hungary | Indonesia |
| Iran | Iraq |
| Israel | Kiribati |
| Kuwait | Latvia |
| Mexico | Mongolia |
| Panama | Peru |
| Portugal | Samoa |
| Saudi Arabia | Sri Lanka |
| Tonga | Yemen |
| Category 5: Beijing Backers | 89 UN member states |
| Algeria | Angola |
| Azerbaijan | Belarus |
| Benin | Bolivia |
| Botswana | Burkina Faso |
| Burundi | Cabo Verde |
| Cambodia | Cameroon |
| Central African Republic | Chad |
| China | Colombia |
| Comoros | Congo |
| Côte d’Ivoire | Cuba |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | Djibouti |
| Dominica | Ecuador |
| Egypt | El Salvador |
| Equatorial Guinea | Eritrea |
| Ethiopia | Federated States of Micronesia |
| Fiji | Gabon |
| Gambia | Ghana |
| Guinea | Guinea-Bissau |
| Kazakhstan | Kenya |
| Kyrgyzstan | Laos |
| Lesotho | Liberia |
| Libya | Madagascar |
| Malawi | Maldives |
| Mali | Mauritania |
| Mauritius | Moldova |
| Morocco | Mozambique |
| Namibia | Nauru |
| Nepal | Nicaragua |
| Niger | Nigeria |
| North Korea | Pakistan |
| Papua New Guinea | Russia |
| Rwanda | São Tomé and Príncipe |
| Senegal | Serbia |
| Seychelles | Sierra Leone |
| Solomon Islands | Somalia |
| South Africa | South Sudan |
| Sudan | Suriname |
| Syria | Tajikistan |
| Tanzania | Timor-Leste |
| Togo | Tunisia |
| Turkmenistan | Uganda |
| United Arab Emirates | Uruguay |
| Uzbekistan | Vanuatu |
| Venezuela | Zambia |
| Zimbabwe |
Notes
- Jude Blanchette, Briana Boland, and Lily McElwee, “What is Beijing’s Timeline for ‘Reunification’ with Taiwan?”, Interpret: China, CSIS, 26 May 2023, https://interpret.csis.org/what-is-beijings-timeline-for-reunification-with-taiwan/.
- “Trends of Core Political Attitudes”, Election Study Center, NCCU, https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/eng/PageDoc?fid=7424; “Biden Tells 60 Minutes US Troops would Defend Taiwan, but White House Says This is not Official US Policy”, CBS News, 18 September 2022, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/president-joe-biden-taiwan-60-minutes-2022-09-18/.
- Marcin Szczepańsk, China’s Economic Coercion: Evolution, Characteristics and Countermeasures (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2022), 5.
- Marcin Szczepańsk, China’s Economic Coercion: Evolution, Characteristics and Countermeasures (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2022), 5.
- “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era”, The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and The State Council Information Office, 10 August 2022, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202208/10/content_WS62f34f46c6d02e533532f0ac.html; “Questions and Answers Concerning the Taiwan Question (2): What is the One-China Principle? What is the Basis of the One-China Principle”, Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 15 August 2022, http://eu.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/more/20220812Taiwan/202208/t20220815_10743591.htm.
- “Beijing Declaration on Jointly Building an All-Weather China–Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 5 September 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202409/t20240905_11485993.html.
- This position sometimes takes the form of respecting PRC “efforts to realise national reunification”. See, for example, “Joint Statement on Deepening Traditional Friendly Relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Albania”, The Office of the Chargé d’Affaires of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Lithuania, 21 April 2009, http://lt.china-office.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/200905/t20090513_2693048.htm.
- Although the government in Taipei has 12 diplomatic partners, this includes the Holy See, which is a UN observer rather than member state. See “Diplomatic Allies”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), accessed 10 December 2024, https://en.mofa.gov.tw/AlliesIndex.aspx?n=1294&sms=1007; and “Non-Member States”, The United Nations, accessed 10 December 2024, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/non-member-states. The government in Taipei therefore has 11 diplomatic partners among the 193 UN member states. See “Growth in United Nations Membership”, The United Nations, accessed 10 December 2024, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/growth-in-un-membership.
- Six Mixed Signallers also support PRC efforts to “achieve national reunification”: Albania, Armenia, Malaysia, Myanmar, North Macedonia, and Romania.
- To note, some countries that maintain one-China policies, including Japan and the United Kingdom, do not explicitly describe them as such.
- Although most countries that maintain one-China policies also recognise the PRC as the sole legal government representing China, this is not true in all cases. Singapore, for example, maintains a one-China policy and recognises the PRC, but has stopped short of recognising the PRC as the sole legal government representing China. See, for example, “Joint Statement on Bilateral Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Singapore and the Government of the People’s Republic of China”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 April 2000, https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/2000041101.htm.
- Benjamin Herscovitch and Mark Harrison, Enhancing Australia’s Taiwan Ties (Lowy Institute, 6 December 2023), 4, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/enhancing-australia-s-taiwan-ties.
- Although this is true of all 40 Status Quo-ists in category two, the 23 Mixed Signallers from category three maintain what they describe as one-China policies and yet also endorse China’s sovereignty over Taiwan.
- Chong Ja Ian, “The Many ‘One Chinas’: Multiple Approaches to Taiwan and China”, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 February 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/02/the-many-one-chinas-multiple-approaches-to-taiwan-and-china?lang=en.
- “Questions and Answers Concerning the Taiwan Question (2): What is The One-China Principle? What is the Basis of the One-China Principle?”, Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 15 August 2022, http://eu.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/more/20220812Taiwan/202208/t20220815_10743591.htm.
- Jude Blanchette, Briana Boland, and Lily McElwee, “What is Beijing’s Timeline for ‘Reunification’ with Taiwan?”, Interpret: China, CSIS, 26 May 2023, https://interpret.csis.org/what-is-beijings-timeline-for-reunification-with-taiwan/.
- “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era”, The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and The State Council Information Office, 10 August 2022, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202208/10/content_WS62f34f46c6d02e533532f0ac.html; “Questions and Answers Concerning the Taiwan Question (2): What is the One-China Principle? What is the Basis of the One-China Principle?”, Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 15 August 2022, http://eu.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/more/20220812Taiwan/202208/t20220815_10743591.htm.
- The 11 countries in category one would not have endorsed the PRC’s version of the claim that Taiwan is part of China even if they endorse the claim that Taiwan is part of the Republic of China.
- “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era”, The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and The State Council Information Office, 10 August 2022, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202208/10/content_WS62f34f46c6d02e533532f0ac.html.
- “Questions and Answers Concerning the Taiwan Question (2): What is the One-China Principle? What is the Basis of the One-China Principle?”, Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 15 August 2022, http://eu.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/more/20220812Taiwan/202208/t20220815_10743591.htm.
- “Joint Press Communiqué between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the People’s Republic of China”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand, 19 October 2023, https://www.mfa.go.th/en/content/jointpresscommuniquethailandandchina; and “Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and Malaysia on Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership towards China–Malaysia Community with a Shared Future”, The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 20 June 2024, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202406/20/content_WS6673e985c6d0868f4e8e85e6.html.
- “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era”, The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and The State Council Information Office, 10 August 2022, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202208/10/content_WS62f34f46c6d02e533532f0ac.html.
- Benjamin Herscovitch, “The Information Battle and Taiwan Strait Security”, in US–Australia–Japan Trilateral Cooperation on Strategic Stability in the Taiwan Strait, eds. Charles Edel and Christopher Johnstone (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024), 56–57.
- For analysis of this trend, see Benjamin Herscovitch, “Beijing’s ‘One-China Principle’ is Spreading”, The Interpreter, 10 September 2024, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/beijing-s-one-china-principle-spreading.
- This included every African state except Eswatini, which recognises the government in Taipei. See “Diplomatic Allies”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), accessed 10 December 2024, https://en.mofa.gov.tw/AlliesIndex.aspx?n=1294&sms=1007.
- “Beijing Declaration on Jointly Building an All-Weather China–Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 5 September 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202409/t20240905_11485993.html.
- As highlighted in the next section, even more countries have expressed support for PRC efforts to “achieve national reunification” without also endorsing its one-China principle.
- Notwithstanding their formal statements of support for PRC efforts to “achieve national reunification”, these countries might still oppose in practice specific measures that the Chinese government could employ, such as, for example, a full-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan.
- See, for example, Cebelihle Mbuyisa, “Chinese Roots Deepen in Africa’s Last Taiwan Holdout”, Semafor, 10 September 2024, https://www.semafor.com/article/09/10/2024/china-ramps-up-ties-in-eswatini-africas-last-taiwan-ally; Lawrence Chung, “As Guatemala Considers Trade Ties with Mainland China, Taiwanese Warned to Worry about Loss of Allies”, South China Morning Post, 10 February 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3251552/guatemala-considers-trade-ties-mainland-china-taiwanese-warned-worry-about-loss-allies; and “Pacific Island Palau Says China is Pressing for Taiwan Switch”, Islands Business, 1 November 2024, https://islandsbusiness.com/news-break/palau-switch/.
- Benjamin Herscovitch, “The Information Battle and Taiwan Strait Security”, in US–Australia–Japan Trilateral Cooperation on Strategic Stability in the Taiwan Strait, eds. Charles Edel and Christopher Johnstone (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024), 56–57; and Benjamin Herscovitch, “Beijing’s ‘One-China Principle’ is Spreading”, The Interpreter, 10 September 2024, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/beijing-s-one-china-principle-spreading.
- Jacques deLisle and Bonnie S. Glaser, Why UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 Does Not Establish Beijing’s “One China” Principle: A Legal Perspective (German Marshall Fund, 2024), 29.
- Chong Ja Ian, “The Many ‘One Chinas’: Multiple Approaches to Taiwan and China”, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 February 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/02/the-many-one-chinas-multiple-approaches-to-taiwan-and-china?lang=en.
- See, for example, “Interview with Charles Edel, CSIS, Washington, DC”, Australian Government, Department of Defence, 11 July 2022, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/transcripts/2022-07-11/interview-charles-edel-csis-washington-dc; and “Beijing Declaration on Jointly Building an All-Weather China–Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 5 September 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202409/t20240905_11485993.html.
- “Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relation between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Slovenia”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 12 May 1992, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367108.html; “Interview of Prime Minister Janez Janša for the Indian National Television Doordarshan”, Republic of Slovenia, 17 January 2022, https://www.gov.si/en/news/2022-01-17-interview-of-prime-minister-janez-jansa-for-the-indian-national-television-doordarshan/; and “Traditional Friendly Relations a Good Basis for Slovenian–Chinese Cooperation in the UN Security Council”, Republic of Slovenia, 17 April 2024, https://www.gov.si/en/news/2024-04-17-traditional-friendly-relations-a-good-basis-for-slovenian-chinese-cooperation-in-the-un-security-council/.
- For discussions of PRC disinformation about Taiwan, see Benjamin Herscovitch, “The Information Battle and Taiwan Strait Security”, in US–Australia–Japan Trilateral Cooperation on Strategic Stability in the Taiwan Strait, eds. Charles Edel and Christopher Johnstone (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024), 56–57; and Benjamin Herscovitch and Mark Harrison, Enhancing Australia’s Taiwan Ties (Lowy Institute, 6 December 2023), 12.
The author wishes to thank Rowan Callick, Ja Ian Chong, Bonnie S. Glaser, and Lowy Institute internal reviewers for invaluable comments on earlier versions of this paper. Any errors or omissions remain the author’s sole responsibility.
