Democratic erosion is the incremental and multifaceted deterioration in the freedoms, guarantees, and processes vital to the functioning of democracy. Various studies have tried to pinpoint one cause or set of causes of democratic erosion. But we argue that democratic erosion is a systems problem that is best understood by applying systems thinking to identify and explore the complex processes and pathways behind the phenomenon. This interactive feature illustrates those dynamics and uses systems mapping to show how reinforcing “loops” — the circular chains of cause and effect — accelerate democratic erosion.
Democracy is both a system of government and an idea. As a form of government, democracy is meant to reflect the will and consent of the governed. It is defined by contestation and participation, civil and political rights, and free and fair elections. Democracy, particularly liberal democracy, is also defined by values and ideas. People are believed to be free, equal, and possessing inalienable rights and liberties. These principles stand apart from majority sentiment. Liberal democracies guard against the tyranny of the majority and government’s ability to infringe on these rights. Democracy also comes in many variations and degrees of consolidation.
...the world now has fewer democracies than autocracies for the first time in more than 20 years, and liberal democracy has become the least common regime type in the world.
In the 20th century, democracy came to be viewed as a "universally relevant system" and a universal value. 1 But in the 21st century, as a governing system, an ideal, and an inevitability, democracy is in trouble. The democratisation wave of the mid-1980s and 1990s has receded and an autocratising wave rises in its stead. Numerous global indices have measured global democratic decline. According to the latest V-Dem Institute Report, the world now has fewer democracies than autocracies for the first time in more than 20 years, and liberal democracy has become the least common regime type in the world.2 Annual surveys by Freedom House have measured two decades of global decline in the rights and liberties that sustain liberal democracy. The Economist Intelligence Unit measured its lowest global democratic index score in 2024, with 130 out of 167 countries measured showing either no improvement or decline.3 Even longstanding, wealthy democracies are not immune. The United States’ status as a democracy has dipped across several global democracy rankings. 4 And the democratic status of newer democracies such as Hungary and Türkiye has eroded.
That global democracy is in decline may seem like a contradictory claim when 2024 was dubbed “the year of elections”. Some 3.7 billion people — almost half of the world’s population — voted across 72 countries, making it the biggest election year in history. However, democratic erosion often occurs despite, and even through, the voting process. Citizens can “vote away the democracies they claim to cherish”.5 Democracy is also more than elections; it is a set of values, norms, and other participatory mechanisms that must be continually safeguarded.
Like natural erosion, democratic erosion is often not obvious until the effects are well advanced.
Democratic decline is incremental and multifaceted. Democracies rarely abruptly change through revolutions or coups. Democratic subversion almost always happens under the guise of seemingly legitimate objectives such as stemming corruption, cleaning up electoral processes, or enhancing national security.6 Anti-democratic leaders are often at pains to maintain the appearance of democracy and a veneer of legality.7 Each element of democratic erosion can seem too inconsequential to threaten democracy on its own. Its impact is only perceived over time and in combination with other factors. Like natural erosion, democratic erosion is often not obvious until the effects are well advanced.8
It is difficult to determine the point at which a nation ceases to be a democracy. Democracy is never truly consolidated; it is a practice rather than a defined-end state. Democratic erosion can lead to a temporary loss of democratic quality or a complete breakdown into autocracy. Many times, democracies fall between these two poles. But there are a number of reinforcing dynamics that accelerate democratic erosion. If those are not interrupted or are left unchecked, the quality of democracy diminishes until its structural integrity is compromised.
There is no single route to, or cause of, democratic erosion. Each case of democratic erosion is unique, but all instances are characterised by the same three elements: conditions that either create a desire for change or solicit a feeling of threat that provides an opportunity for action; actors who exploit these conditions for an anti-democratic agenda or consolidation of power; and pathways that allow these conditions and actors to hollow out democracy.
Democratic erosion occurs against a backdrop of certain conditions that provide opportunities for anti-democratic actors and make democratic erosion more likely. The conditions listed here, while not exhaustive, provide opportunities for democratic erosion. Often, they are interconnected and interrelated. Conditions can exist prior to the occurrence of democratic erosion, or they can be created or exacerbated by anti-democratic actors and processes. These conditions create a degree of dissatisfaction or insecurity, or generate grievances that anti-democratic actors can exploit to mobilise voters, engage in illiberal manoeuvres and unconstitutional actions, or justify anti-democratic constitutional or legislative change.
The existence of facilitating conditions is not sufficient to explain democratic erosion. There must be anti-democratic actors with the motivation, will, and ability to take advantage of these conditions and who engage in processes and actions that erode democratic rules and norms. Anti-democratic executives and political parties have been identified as having the most impact on democratic erosion, but democratic erosion depends on the choices and actions of many actors who often gain some personal or institutional benefit through alignment with an anti-democratic leader or movement. Actors are not always active agents; they can also accept or acquiesce to anti-democratic actions. Actors who contribute to democratic erosion have a weak commitment to or outright reject the constitution and democratic norms, deny the legitimacy of their opponents, tolerate violent or extrajudicial conduct, and tolerate or engage in the repression of the opposition, media, civil society, or civil liberties.9
Democracy is a complex system made up of many actors, institutions, practices, and norms. Democratic erosion is therefore also a complex political and social phenomenon. Multiple pathways exist that lead to the erosion of the defining features of democracy. It is a dynamic that cannot be described through linear cause-and-effect explanations. It is best understood by applying systems thinking and systems mapping to illustrate how different parts of a system interact and influence each other. In this systems map, we show how a number of the preceding conditions and actors contribute to democratic erosion by illustrating the causal pathways between the factors and elements these conditions and actors create. Some of these pathways become “reinforcing loops” or sequences of mutual cause-and-effect that create a feedback loop that amplifies decline. We identify five reinforcing loops of democratic erosion: 1) anti-democratic actors gain and consolidate power; 2) weakening of balancing institutions, guardrails, and norms; 3) entrenched division; 4) loss of faith in democracy; and 5) support for and use of political violence.
For democratic erosion to occur, there first must be a set of underlying or facilitating conditions. However, these conditions are not determinative. Democracy is a system of government “for the people, by the people, and of the people”. From political leaders to average citizens, the choices and actions that people make within a democracy are instrumental to either its erosion or its safeguarding. It is only when these conditions are exploited by motivated anti-democratic actors or create a situation where enough citizens lose faith in their democracy, that democratic erosion occurs.
Each element of democratic erosion can seem inconsequential on its own. Its impact is often only perceived over time and in combination with other factors, which is why systems mapping is useful to understand and illustrate the phenomenon. The cumulative effect of the processes described is an erosion of checks and balances, rule of law, normative commitments to democracy, equal opportunities, and the other freedoms and guarantees that are the defining features of democracy, ultimately leading to the arbitrary exercise of power by an executive.
The systems map included in this interactive feature is conceptual. To apply accurately to any specific country, the map can be adapted to draw on an understanding of local actors, contexts, and dynamics. But the patterns depicted in the systems map occur in multiple backsliding democracies around the world. The five reinforcing loops identified in the map — 1) anti-democratic actors gain and consolidate power; 2) weakening of balancing institutions, guardrails, and norms; 3) entrenched division; 4) loss of faith in democracy; and 5) support for and use of political violence — are common features of democratic erosion worldwide.
The challenge is how to promote more robust and resilient democratic institutions, practices, and norms that can not only survive democratic erosion but bounce back and thrive in an era of democratic backsliding. None of the dynamics examined here is inevitable or irreversible. By more comprehensively illustrating the problem, systems mapping can better depict opportunities for intervention and offer an understanding of how one set of actions taken to counter one aspect of democratic erosion relates to the whole. None of the dynamics examined here is inevitable or irreversible. The systems map can help us understand how the erosion of democracy works, so that democratic societies can guard against it.
This project was developed through funding support from the Australian Department of Home Affairs, Office for Social Cohesion, and the Toda Peace Institute. The systems map was informed by a Toda Peace Institute sponsored working group made up of the authors and their working group collaborators. We would like to acknowledge the input and support of the working group members: Olivia Stokes Dreier, Heidi Burgess, and Guy Burgess, along with the contributing authors Peter Woodrow and Robert Kaufman. We also acknowledge the editorial support of the Lowy Institute’s Clare Caldwell, Hervé Lemahieu, Sam Roggeveen, and Susannah Patton, and the digital design team of Leighton Hughes, Alex Moyse, and Ian Bruce.
This Special Feature was produced by the Lowy Institute in collaboration with the Toda Peace Institute. Responsibility for the views, information, or advice expressed is that of the authors. The contents do not necessarily reflect the views of the Lowy Institute or the Toda Peace Institute.