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2023 Being Chinese in Australia

Public opinion in Chinese
communities

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About the author

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Her research expertise broadly covers Chinese state-society relations, Chinese civil society, the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs and the Chinese diaspora and she has

published widely in these areas. Jennifer provides regular commentary to Australian and international media outlets including, ABC, BBC, CNN and NHK Japan.



Executive summary

In this third nationally representative survey of the Lowy Institute's Being Chinese in Australia series, we asked Chinese-Australians about Australia and the world. As in the two previous surveys, we explored three broad themes: how Chinese-Australians see Australia and their place in it; how they consume news and information; and how they view the wider world. The survey also compares the sentiments expressed by Chinese-Australians with those of the broader Australian population.

Most Chinese-Australians have a positive view of Australia. A majority say that Australia is a good place to live and are proud of the Australian way of life and culture. Three-quarters say they feel a moderate or strong sense of belonging — an increase from the 2021 survey. Fewer Chinese-Australians say they have been called offensive names or physically threatened or attacked because of their heritage in the last year.

The survey also found an increase in support for democracy as a form of government. Almost half of Chinese-Australians say that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, an increase of 14 points since 2021.

A majority of Chinese-Australians use WeChat for their English and Chinese-language news but usage of the app has declined since 2021.

Chinese-Australians have varying degrees of trust in the information they consume. Most trust the English-language media in Australia to report news accurately and fairly. But they are divided as to whether Australian media reporting about China is too negative or fair and balanced. Despite relatively high usage of WeChat among Chinese-Australians, just under half doubt the fairness and accuracy of the news and information it provides. Approximately two-thirds say they are confident in their ability to recognise made-up news or disinformation.

Like the broader population, the issue that most worries Chinese-Australians is a severe downturn in the global economy. But Chinese-Australians are less likely to see China as a military threat than the rest of the population.

There are also significant differences in opinion between Chinese-Australians and the broader population regarding Australia's alliance relationships. Only a slim majority of Chinese-Australians believe that the US alliance is important to Australia, compared to almost 90% of the broader population. Few Chinese-Australians think AUKUS and the Quad make Australia or the region safer. A significant majority of Chinese-Australians believe that Australia should be neutral in any conflict between the United States and China, compared to just over half of the general population.

Chinese-Australians are less likely than the broader population to be in favour of using Australian military forces in other parts of the world. This is particularly the case in relation to China. Most oppose using Australian military forces if China invaded Taiwan and the United States decided to intervene, or for conducting freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea and other disputed areas claimed by China.

When it comes to the countries and leaders Chinese-Australians trust most, Australia tops the list, and no leader we asked about was more trusted than Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. The United Kingdom was the next most trusted country. Former New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern was the second-most trusted leader. Chinese-Australians trust China and President Xi Jinping less than they did in 2021, but still more than the broader Australian population does.

Introduction

There are now some 1.4 million people with Chinese ancestry living in Australia, comprising 5.5% of the population.¹ According to the 2021 census, of Australia's top five ancestries, the only group to have grown since the last census in 2016 was Australians with Chinese ancestry.² The Chinese have a long history in Australia. Some are descendants of Chinese migrants who came to Australia during the gold rush of the nineteenth century. Others are more recent migrants from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and across Southeast Asia.

Understanding the views of such a significant, long-standing community is a worthwhile endeavour. But it is even more important at a time when the effects of growing geopolitical competition are being felt in Australia. In recent years, Chinese-Australians³ have come under greater scrutiny. Questions have been raised about the ties of particular individuals to the government in Beijing. Some Chinese-Australians have had their loyalty to Australia questioned. Grasping the impact that these and other issues are having on how Chinese-Australians see their place in Australian society is critical, therefore, not least to the country's social cohesion.

This is the third annual *Being Chinese in Australia* survey, part of the Lowy Institute's Multiculturalism, Identity and Influence Project. All three nationally representative surveys cover a period of tension in the Australia–China relationship. Australian governments have been blunter and more public about their concerns over Chinese intentions and behaviour.

It was during the first two years of the survey that Australia called for an international inquiry into China's handling of the Covid-19 outbreak and China imposed punitive trade measures — formal and informal — on Australia. The period covered by this third survey, however, has seen a relative improvement in ties, with the resumption of high-level government-to-government contact.

As in the previous two years, this survey explores three broad themes: how Chinese-Australians see Australia and their place in it; how they consume news and information; and how they view the wider world, including growing geopolitical tensions between China and the United States. The survey also compares the sentiments expressed by Chinese-Australians with those of the broader Australian population.

¹ Australian Bureau of Statistics, "Cultural Diversity: Census", 28 June 2022, <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/people-and-communities/cultural-diversity-census/latest-release>.

² Australian Bureau of Statistics, "Cultural Diversity of Australia", 20 September 2022, <https://www.abs.gov.au/articles/cultural-diversity-australia>.

³ For the purposes of reporting the results of the survey, all respondents are referred to as Chinese-Australians. The respondents were all Australian citizens, permanent residents or long-term visa holders who self-identified as having Chinese ancestry. It should be noted that when asked, not all respondents identified as 'Chinese-Australian'. Others preferred to be identified as 'Chinese', 'Australian' or 'Australian-Chinese' — see Table 4, p 44.



The Australian way of life

The Australian way of life

In 2022, a majority of Chinese-Australians continue to rate Australia favourably as a place to live and, to varying degrees, express pride in the Australian way of life and culture. Ninety-two per cent of Chinese-Australians regard Australia as a ‘very good’ or ‘good’ place to live, a 15-point increase since 2020 when polling began, and a nine-point increase compared with 2021. Half now rate Australia as a ‘very good’ place to live (51%).

Age and the length of time spent living in Australia correlate broadly with positive views of the country. Of those who arrived in Australia between 1970 and 2010, 57% rate Australia as a ‘very good’ place to live. By contrast, of those arriving after 2010, 50% regard Australia as a ‘very good’ place to live. Of those aged 45 and over, 56% rate Australia as a ‘very good’ place to live.

Three-quarters (74%) of Chinese-Australians take pride in the Australian way of life and culture to a ‘great extent’ or ‘moderate extent’, a three-point increase from 2021, although still a ten-point decline from the 2020 result.

To put this result into context, we compared it to the same question asked of the broader Australian population in the Scanlon Foundation’s *Mapping Social Cohesion 2022*


survey.⁴ According to that report, 83% of Australians take pride in Australia’s way of life and culture to a ‘great extent’ or ‘moderate extent’.⁵ This means that the gap between the views of Chinese-Australians and the broader population on this question is 9%, although it has narrowed since 2021 when it was 16%.

As with the previous question, age and time spent living in Australia seem to correlate with more positive feelings: those aged 45 and over (31%) are more likely to take pride in Australian life and culture to a ‘great extent’ than younger Chinese-Australians. Similarly, those who came to Australia before 2010 (36%) are more likely than those who arrived after 2010 (21%) to take pride to a ‘great extent’.

One notable change in 2022 compared to previous surveys is in attitudes to democracy. Close to half (48%) of Chinese-Australians say that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, an increase of 14 points since 2021. Preference for democracy does not differ greatly between those born in Australia (50%) and those born in an Asian country (47%). Those who say that in some circumstances a non-democratic government can be preferable declined by nine points to 36%. The number of Chinese-Australians who say it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have also declined, from 21% to 15%.

Figure 1:
Australia as a place to live

The overwhelming majority of Chinese-Australians continue to see Australia as a good or very good place to live.



⁴The *Mapping Social Cohesion 2022* survey was in the field from 11 to 24 July 2022.


⁵James O’Donnell, *Mapping Social Cohesion 2022*, (Melbourne: Scanlon Foundation).

Figure 2:
Pride in Australian life and culture

Three-quarters of Chinese-Australians report pride in Australian life and culture in 2022.

QUESTION To what extent do you take pride in the Australian way of life and culture?

■ To a great extent
 ■ To a moderate extent
 ■ Only slightly
 ■ Not at all
■ Not sure / Prefer not to say




Data for the broader Australian population is from the [Scanlon Foundation Mapping Social Cohesion 2022 report](#).

Figure 3:
Views on democracy

Survey data over the last three years show that increasing numbers of Chinese-Australians see democracy as preferable to any other kind of government.

QUESTION Please indicate which one of the three statements comes closest to your own personal views about democracy.

■ Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government
■ For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have
■ In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable
■ Not sure





Belonging & community

Belonging and community

In the 2022 survey, as in previous years, we asked Chinese-Australians about their identity. Four in ten self-identify as Chinese-Australian (41%), 32% as Chinese, 18% as Australian-Chinese and 5% as Australian.

Three-quarters (75%) of Chinese-Australians report a 'great' or 'moderate' sense of belonging to Australia — an increase of 11 points from 2021. The percentage of Chinese-Australians who report a connection to their local community also grew by six points since 2021 to 67% in 2022. Those reporting a sense of belonging to 'the Chinese people' experienced a three-point decline to 66%. Those who report a 'great' or 'moderate' sense of belonging to China fell six points to 56%.


Chinese-Australians' sense of belonging to Australia and to their local community does not differ significantly whether they use English, Mandarin or Cantonese at home.⁶ A sense

of belonging to Australia ('great' and 'moderate') is similar across all three language groups: English 80%, Mandarin 75% and Cantonese 76%. When it comes to a sense of belonging to the local community, Chinese-Australians report the following across the three language groups: English 77%, Mandarin 64% and Cantonese 72%. There is greater differentiation between the three language groups when looking at Chinese-Australians' sense of belonging to China: English 54%, Mandarin 67% and Cantonese 46%. A sense of belonging to the Chinese people is equally varied: English 56%, Mandarin 75% and Cantonese 61%.

Figure 4:
Self-identification

Six in ten identify as Chinese-Australian or Australian-Chinese.

QUESTION Overall, do you think yourself as:




⁶Data on main language other than English used at home is regarded as a measure of an individual's active association with their cultural or ethnic group. See Australian Bureau of Statistics, "1249.0 — Australian Standard Classification of Cultural and Ethnic Groups (ASCEG), 2016", 18 July 2016, <https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/allprimarymainfeatures/EFAAAA766091FE94CA2584D30012B99D?opendocument=>.

Figure 5.0:
Sense of belonging

In 2022, three-quarters of Chinese-Australians feel a sense of belonging to Australia.

QUESTION To what extent do you have a sense of belonging to Australia?

■ To a great extent ■ To a moderate extent ■ Only slightly ■ Not at all




Data for the broader Australian population is from the [Scanlon Foundation Mapping Social Cohesion 2022](#)

Figure 5.1:
Sense of belonging

Chinese-Australians' sense of belonging to their local community increased in 2022, but attachment to China declined.

QUESTION To what extent do you have a sense of belonging to...?

■ To a great extent ■ To a moderate extent ■ Only slightly ■ Not at all



Personal experiences of discrimination

In 2022, one-third of Chinese-Australians (35%) report being treated differently or less favourably in the last 12 months because of their Chinese heritage. On the other hand, a third (33%) also say someone expressed support for them because of their Chinese heritage. Both of these results remain unchanged since the 2021 survey.

One in five (21%) Chinese-Australians say they were called offensive names because of their heritage in 2022. This is down four points from 25% in 2021, and down ten points from 31% in 2020.

A key finding of the 2020 survey was that a sizable minority of Chinese-Australians (18%) reported being physically threatened or attacked because of their Chinese heritage. This figure remained the same in 2021 but declined four points to 14% in 2022.

Across all three surveys to date, there has been a decline in the number of Chinese-Australians reporting that they have been called offensive names, or physically threatened or attacked because of their Chinese heritage.

In 2022, more Chinese-Australians under the age of 45 report being treated differently or less favourably than those aged 45 and over (38% vs 32%). Similarly, more Chinese-Australians under the age of 45 report being called offensive names than those aged 45 and over (24% vs 18%). There is no significant age difference when it comes to those who report being physically threatened or attacked.

More Chinese-Australians born in Australia report experiences of discrimination than Chinese-Australians born in China (including Hong Kong and Macau): 30% vs 19% report being called offensive names; and 20% vs 14% report being physically threatened or attacked.

Figure 6.0:
Personal experience of
discrimination

Fewer Chinese-Australians in 2022 have been called offensive names or been physically threatened or attacked because of their heritage.

QUESTION For each of the following, please indicate if you have or have not personally experienced it in the last 12 months in Australia.

■ Yes, has happened to me in the last 12 months
■ No, has not happened to me in the last 12 months





Figure 6.1:
Personal experience of discrimination
– by age group and country of birth

To obtain greater detail of Chinese-Australians’ experiences of discrimination, we look at age and country of birth as factors. Younger Chinese-Australians and those born in Australia are more likely to report an experience of discrimination.

QUESTION For each of the following, please indicate if you have or have not personally experienced it in the last 12 months in Australia?

■ Yes, has happened to me





Media use & news habits

Media use and news habits

One key theme of the survey is understanding how Chinese-Australians consume news and social media and their confidence in the veracity of various sources of information.

The three most popular social media platforms used on a daily basis by Chinese-Australians (combining ‘several times a day’ with ‘about once a day’) are: YouTube at 58%, Facebook at 49% and WeChat at 47%. There is a nine-point difference between WeChat and the fourth-most popular social media site, Instagram, with 38% using it on a daily basis.

Just over a quarter (26%) of Chinese-Australians use TikTok (or Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok) daily. Around four in ten (37%) Chinese-Australians never use TikTok/Douyin. A quarter (25%) use Twitter daily, 17% use LINE (a communication app favoured by those from Taiwan) and 16% use Weibo (the Chinese version of Twitter). When respondents were given the opportunity to identify other social media they use frequently, Little Red Book/Xiaohongshu — roughly equivalent to Instagram — was the most popular social media platform cited.

Given the ubiquity of WeChat in China, it is unsurprising that those born in the People’s Republic of China are its most frequent users. Seventy-six per cent of those born in China indicate that they use WeChat daily. In general, younger Chinese-Australians use WeChat more than older Chinese-Australians: 54% of all Chinese-Australians aged 18 to 44 use WeChat daily, compared with 34% of those aged 45 and over.

Those Chinese-Australians who use Mandarin or Cantonese at home use YouTube more frequently than those who use English at home (65% and 63% respectively vs 47%). More Chinese-Australians who use English or Cantonese at home

use Facebook than those who use Mandarin at home (58% and 54% respectively vs 44%). More Chinese-Australians who use Mandarin at home engage with WeChat on a daily basis (66%) compared to those who use English at home (22%) and Cantonese at home (40%).

WeChat continues to play a central role as a source of news for Chinese-Australians, although its importance has declined compared to the previous survey. Three-quarters (75%) say they ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ get their news from the app, down 11 points from 2021. Fifty-eight per cent of Chinese-Australians ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ get their English-language news via WeChat, a decline of five points since 2021.⁷

Confidence in the Australian media’s reporting of China has improved in 2022. The number of Chinese-Australians who believe Australian media reporting about China is too negative has declined 15 points, from 57% to 42%. The number who believe the Australian media is ‘fair and balanced’ is up nine points to 42% from 33%. Indeed, there has also been a small increase in those who feel Australian media reporting of China is too positive, up from 9% to 13%.

Trust in sources of information differs from outlet to outlet. Trust in Australian-based media outlets, whether in English or Chinese, has increased slightly over the past year. Three-quarters (76%) of Chinese-Australians trust English-language media in Australia ‘a great deal’ or ‘somewhat’ to report news accurately and fairly — a jump of five points. Nearly two-thirds (64%) trust Chinese-language media outlets based in Australia — a smaller increase of three points. Trust in Chinese-language media outlets based in China remains steady at 55%, and trust in news that is shared on WeChat Official Accounts declined by three points to 46%.

⁷ Those who answered as having used WeChat in “Now thinking about the social media sites you use...About how often do you visit or use...” were shown “Thinking just about WeChat. Please indicate if you use WeChat often, sometimes or never to get your English/Chinese-language news.” Thus, 82% of the surveyed Chinese-Australians answered the latter question.


We also asked Chinese-Australians for their views on made-up news,⁸ or what is commonly referred to as ‘fake news’ or false information. The circulation of ‘fake news’ and/or false information was a particular concern of the Australian Electoral Commission during the 2022 federal election campaign.⁹ The survey asked Chinese-Australians whether they encountered any made-up news during the campaign period: 27% indicated they had.

Many Chinese-Australians report having taken actions to either verify reports or reduce their potential exposure to made-up news. More than half (54%) say they check the facts themselves, and 54% say concern over made-up news led them to stop getting news from a specific outlet. Around 45% say they reduced their usage of news sites overall, and 46% changed the way they use social media. A third (34%) say they reported or flagged a story they thought was made up.

Figure 7: Social media usage and frequency

WeChat and YouTube are equally popular among Chinese-Australians, with nearly the same percentage of people who use it several times a day.

QUESTION Thinking about the social media sites you use... About how often do you visit or use ...



*Xiaohongshu or Little Red Book is the most frequently used ‘other’ social media site as determined by ‘several times a day’


⁸The survey questions on ‘made-up news’ are modelled on the Pew Research Center. Therefore, the survey and this report do not deviate from the term ‘made-up news’. See for example, Amy Mitchell, Jeffrey Gottfried, Galen Stocking, Mason Walker and Sophia Fedeli, “Many Americans Say Made-Up News is a Critical Problem that Needs to be Fixed”, Pew Research Center, 5 June 2019, <https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2019/06/05/many-americans-say-made-up-news-is-a-critical-problem-that-needs-to-be-fixed/>.

⁹Australian Electoral Commission, “AEC Launches Disinformation Register ahead of 2022 Poll”, Media Release, 7 March 2022, <https://www.aec.gov.au/media/2022/03-07.htm>.

Figures 8:
WeChat and English/Chinese-language news

WeChat remains frequently used to access English and Chinese-language news but there is a decline in its usage since 2021.

QUESTION Now thinking about WeChat in particular. Please indicate if you use WeChat often, sometimes or never to get your English/Chinese-language news.



Figures for this chart are based on 82% of the Chinese-Australian population who indicate they have used WeChat in the following question: "Thinking about the social media sites you use. About how often do you visit or use..."

Figure 9:
Australian media reporting about China

Increasing numbers of Chinese-Australians say that Australian media reporting about China is fair and balanced.

QUESTION Overall, would you say Australian media reporting about China is too positive, too negative or fair and balanced?




Figure 10:
Trust in sources of information

Australian media outlets are most trusted to report news accurately and fairly.

QUESTION How much do you trust the following sources to report news accurately and fairly?

A great deal Somewhat Not very much Not at all



Figure 11:
2022 Federal election

A quarter of Chinese-Australians say they encountered made-up news during the federal election of 2022.

QUESTION During the federal election held on Saturday 21 May 2022, did you see any stories about politics or the election that seemed completely made-up news?




Figure 12:
Made-up news

Two-thirds of Chinese-Australians are confident in recognising made-up news.

QUESTION How confident are you in your own ability to recognise news that is made-up news?





Figure 13:
Made-up news and taking action

Chinese-Australians are more likely to stop getting news from a specific outlet and check the facts of news stories in response to the issue of made-up news.

QUESTION Has the issue of made-up news and information led you to do any of the following?

Yes, have done this No, have not done this





Trust in countries & confidence in world leaders

Trust in countries and confidence in world leaders

Chinese-Australians largely report similar levels of trust in major powers as they did in 2021 with a few notable exceptions: trust in Australia has increased, while trust in China and Russia has decreased (see Table 14.0, p. 49).

Of the ten countries listed, Australia is the most trusted to act responsibly in the world. Three-quarters (75%) trust it ‘a great deal’ or ‘somewhat’ to act responsibly, a seven-point increase since 2021. This places Australia well ahead of the next most trusted countries: the United Kingdom on 62%, and China on 61%. Trust in China declined by six points compared to the 2021 survey.

The following four countries and territories are trusted by more than half of the Chinese-Australian population: Taiwan at 54% (up slightly by three points), Hong Kong (54%), the United States (53%), and Japan at 51% (down four points compared to 2021).

Only 37% of Chinese-Australians trust Indonesia and Russia ‘a great deal’ or ‘somewhat’ to act responsibly in the world, with Russia recording an eight-point decline compared to 2021. India (32%) continues to sit at the bottom of the list as the least trusted country.

Some key differences emerge when comparing the trust Chinese-Australians have in particular countries with the broader population (as recorded in the 2022 Lowy Institute Poll).¹⁰ While 61% of Chinese-Australians say they trust China ‘a great deal’ or ‘somewhat’, only 12% of the Australian population say the same. While 37% of Chinese-Australians trust Russia, only 5% of the broader Australian population feel similarly.

With respect to world leaders, Chinese-Australians have more confidence in Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to do the right thing in world affairs than any other world leader they were asked about. Six in ten Chinese-Australians (60%) have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ confidence in Prime Minister Albanese. The next most trusted leaders are former New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern (who was prime minister at the time of fieldwork) at 49%, and Chinese President Xi Jinping at 42%. Sitting in the middle of the spectrum are French President Emmanuel Macron on 37% and US President Joe Biden on 34%.

Chinese-Australians have similar levels of confidence in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (32%), Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen (32%) and Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee Ka-chiu (31%). These are followed by Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (29%) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (29%). At the bottom of the list sits North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at 17%.

In 2022, a quarter of Chinese-Australians (25%) have confidence in Opposition Leader Peter Dutton. In the 2021 survey, we asked Chinese-Australians about their level of confidence in the then Leader of the Opposition Anthony Albanese. In that survey, four in ten (44%) Chinese-Australians had confidence in him.


¹⁰ The 2022 Lowy Institute Poll was in the field between 15 and 28 March 2022.

Figure 14:
Trust in major powers

Chinese-Australians trust Australia more than any other country to act responsibly in the world.

QUESTION Now about various countries and territories in the world. How much do you trust the following countries or territories to act responsibly in the world?

■ A great deal ■ Somewhat ■ Not very much ■ Not at all




Data for the broader Australian population is from the [2022 Lowy Institute Poll](#).

Figure 15:
Trust in political leaders

Chinese-Australians express the highest confidence in the Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.

QUESTION How much confidence do you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs?

■ A lot of confidence
 ■ Some confidence
 ■ Not too much confidence
■ No confidence at all
 ■ Not sure of my view
 ■ Not sure who the person is



Data for the broader Australian population is from the [2022 Lowy Institute Poll](#).

*The survey was in the field prior to Jacinda Ardern announcing her resignation on 19 January 2023.



Security & foreign policy

Security and foreign policy

Chinese-Australians have consistently ranked a severe downturn in the global economy as the top, or equal top, threat to Australia's vital interests over the last three years. In 2022, nine in ten (90%) Chinese-Australians say a severe downturn in the global economy is a 'critical' or 'an important threat'.

While half of the Chinese-Australian population (51%) in 2021 said Australia–China relations were a 'critical threat' to Australia's vital interests in the next ten years, this figure dropped to 37% in 2022. Those who see foreign interference in Australian politics as a critical threat remained stable at 36%.

Just over a third of Chinese-Australians (36%) say a military conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan is a 'critical threat' to Australian interests.

Thirty-five per cent of Chinese-Australians see political instability in the United States, climate change, Covid-19 and other potential epidemics as a 'critical threat'. While there was a 13-point increase between 2020 and 2021 in those who saw climate change as a 'critical threat', this figure dropped by eight points in 2022. Concern about Covid-19 and other potential epidemics also dropped by a substantial 21 points between 2021 and 2022.

The number who saw the dissemination of false information or fake news as a 'critical threat' (32%) dropped by seven points from 2021, while the number concerned about cyberattacks rose slightly by three points (32%). A quarter (27%) of Chinese-Australians see North Korea's nuclear program as a 'critical threat' to Australia's vital interests, a slight increase of two points.

When compared with results from the 2022 Lowy Institute Poll, the Being Chinese in Australia survey shows some interesting similarities and differences between the threat perceptions of Chinese-Australians and the broader Australian population. The two groups are most similar in their view of the threat posed to Australian vital interests by a severe downturn in the global economy and political instability in the United States.

When it comes to the foreign policies of other countries, the differences in threat perceptions are more marked. Twenty-eight per cent of Chinese-Australians consider China's foreign policy as a 'critical threat', compared to 65% of the broader population. A quarter (25%) of Chinese-Australians see Russia's foreign policy as a 'critical threat', compared to 68% of the broader population.

Chinese-Australians are also less concerned about Russia's activities in the world: 60% say they are 'very' or 'somewhat' concerned about Russia's invasion of Ukraine, compared to 92% of the broader Australian population. Less than half (47%) of Chinese-Australians are 'very' or 'somewhat' concerned about Russian cooperation with China, compared to 87% of the broader Australian population. Around four in ten Chinese-Australians (43%) are concerned about India–Russia cooperation, compared to 72% of the broader Australian population.

Fifty-seven per cent of Chinese-Australians say they are 'very' or 'somewhat' concerned about China potentially opening a military base in a Pacific Island country. There is much greater concern among the broader population about this possibility, with 88% saying they are 'very' or 'somewhat' concerned.

There are also significant differences when it comes to two of Australia's security partnerships: AUKUS and the Quad.

Twenty-seven per cent of Chinese-Australians say the AUKUS trilateral security partnership established in 2021 between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States will make Australia safer. Around one in four (26%) say AUKUS will make Australia less safe, and the same number say it makes no difference. By contrast, more than half (52%) the Australian population say AUKUS will make Australia more safe, and just under half (49%) say it will make the region more safe.

When considering the Quad — a partnership between Australia, India, Japan and the United States — a third of Chinese-Australians (33%) say it will make Australia more safe, with similar numbers saying it will make Australia less safe (34%) or that it will make no difference (32%). When it comes to the impact of the Quad on the region, 33% say it will make the region safer, 35% say less safe, and 32% believe it makes no difference. By contrast, just over half the broader Australian population say that the Quad will make Australia (53%) and our region (52%) more safe.

There are important differences between Chinese-Australians and the broader population over how to deploy Australian military forces. Only 41% of Chinese-Australians are in favour of deploying Australian forces to conduct freedom of navigation naval operations in the South China Sea and other disputed areas claimed by China, compared to 60% of the broader population. Just over a third (36%) of Chinese-Australians favour the use of Australian military forces if China were to invade Taiwan and the United States decided to intervene, compared to 51% of the broader population.

However, a majority of Chinese-Australians are in favour of deploying the Australian military to stop a government from committing genocide and killing large numbers of its own people (63%), or to restore law and order in a Pacific nation (59%). A slim majority of 53% are supportive of using the Australian military to fight against violent extremist groups in the Middle East.

Figure 16.0:
Threats to vital Australian interests

For Chinese-Australians, a severe downturn in the global economy consistently ranks as one of the most critical threats to Australia’s interests over the past three years.

QUESTION Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interests of Australia in the next ten years. Do you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all?

■ Critical threat
 ■ An important but not critical threat
 ■ Not an important threat at all
■ Don't know
 ■ Not sure





Figure 16.1:
Threats to vital Australian interests

Chinese-Australians and the broader population are most similar in their perceived threat of political instability in the United States but differ on Russia’s and China’s foreign policies.

QUESTION Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interests of Australia in the next ten years. Do you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all?

■ Critical threat
 ■ An important but not critical threat
 ■ Not an important threat at all
 ■ Not sure




Data for the broader Australian population is from the [2022 Lowy Institute Poll](#).

Figure 17:
Concern about world events:
Russia and China

When it comes to the roles of Russia and China in world affairs, Chinese-Australians are less pessimistic than the broader population.

QUESTION To what extent are you concerned or not concerned about...

Very concerned Somewhat concerned Not too concerned
Not at all concerned Not sure



Data for the broader Australian population is from the [2022 Lowy Institute Poll](#).

Figure 18:
AUKUS

Chinese-Australians are evenly divided about AUKUS and its role in national and regional security.

QUESTION Do you think AUKUS, the security partnership between Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom, will make...

More safe Less safe Makes no difference Not sure
Never heard of AUKUS



Data for the broader Australian population is from the [2022 Lowy Institute Poll](#).

Figure 19:
The Quad

Chinese-Australians are evenly divided about the Quad and its role in national and regional security, as with AUKUS.

QUESTION Do you think the Quad, the partnership between Australia, India, Japan and the United States, will make...

More safe Less safe Makes no difference Not sure
Never heard of Quad




Data for the broader Australian population is from the 2022 Lowy Institute Poll.

Figure 20:
Use of Australian military forces

When compared to the broader population, Chinese-Australians are less favourable on the issue of using Australian military forces, with the exception of fighting against violent extremist groups in the Middle East.

QUESTION There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using Australian military forces in other parts of the world. Please give your opinion about the following situations. Would you personally be in favour or against the use of Australian military forces ...

In favour Against Neither in favour nor against Not sure



Data for the broader Australian population is from the 2022 Lowy Institute Poll.

The image features a blurred Australian flag in the background, with its characteristic red, white, and blue colors and the white seven-pointed star. In the foreground, two security cameras are mounted on a metal surface. One camera is a black, cylindrical model, and the other is a black and silver model. The text 'Foreign interference' is overlaid on the right side of the image in a bold, white, sans-serif font. A thin blue horizontal line is positioned below the text.

Foreign interference

Foreign interference

Concerns about foreign interference in Australia largely focus on Australians of Chinese ancestry and their real or perceived connections with the Chinese government or Chinese community groups. In their ranking of threats to Australian interests, just over a third of respondents (36%) say that foreign interference is a ‘critical threat’, a result similar to previous years (see page 27).

In terms of interactions with the Chinese state in Australia, the 2022 results continue to show low levels of contact with the Chinese embassy or consulates among Chinese-Australians. More than half (54%) of Chinese-Australians report no contact at all over the last 12 months, and only 15% as having had some contact ‘regularly’ and ‘occasionally’.

Just under half of the respondents (46%) say they had interactions with Chinese community and cultural organisations ‘every few months’ or ‘once or twice’ in the past 12 months. Twenty-eight per cent say they had no engagement at all. These numbers have remained consistent over the past three years of the survey.

In a notable shift in 2022, around six in ten (62%) Chinese-Australians are concerned about the influence of the United States on Australian political processes, an increase of 26 points. This is only a little higher than the broader Australian population, with just over half (54%) expressing similar concerns about the United States. But when it comes to Chinese influence on Australian politics, the difference is more significant. Just over half (54%) of Chinese-Australians say they are concerned, compared to 86% of the broader Australian population.

In 2022, there has been an interesting change in Chinese-Australian perceptions of how much attention is being given to the issue of foreign interference by politicians, the media and the public. Fewer Chinese-Australians now say that the attention given to foreign interference is ‘about right’ compared to 2021. But the change is split between those who think ‘too much attention’ is given to the issue of foreign interference and those who think ‘too little’ attention is given.

In 2022, the number of Chinese-Australians who say politicians give the ‘right amount’ of attention to the issue of foreign interference is down 21 points from 50% to 29%. The number who say politicians give ‘too much’ attention to the issue is up 12 points from 31% to 43%, and ‘too little’ attention is up nine points from 19% to 28%.

Four in ten (40%) Chinese-Australians in 2022 believe the media gives too much attention to foreign interference, an increase of six points, while the category ‘about the right amount of attention’ decreased by 15 points to 35%. However, ‘too little attention’ increased by nine points to 25% in 2022.

Fewer Chinese-Australians now believe the public gives ‘too much’ attention to the issue of foreign interference (27%) than those who believe the public pays ‘too little’ attention (38%). Those who believe ‘about the right amount of attention’ is given dropped 23 points to 35%.

Figure 21:
Contact with the Chinese embassy
or consulate

Chinese-Australians continue to report low levels of contact with the Chinese embassy or consulate.

QUESTION Over the last 12 months, how often, if at all, have you had any contact with the Chinese embassy or consulate in your state or territory?

Regularly Occasionally Once or twice Not at all
Not sure / Prefer not to say



Figure 22:
Interaction with Chinese
organisations

Chinese-Australians' interaction with Chinese community and cultural organisations has remained consistent over the past three years.

QUESTION Over the last 12 months, how often, if at all, have you had any interaction with Chinese community and cultural organisations?

At least once a week About once a month Every few months
Once or twice Never Prefer not to say




Figure 23:
Foreign influence in Australian political processes

Around half of Chinese-Australians are concerned about foreign influence on Australia’s political processes from China, while nearly two-thirds are concerned about the influence of the United States.

QUESTION Are you personally concerned or not concerned about the influence of each of the following countries on Australia’s political processes?





Figure 24:
Amount of attention on foreign interference

The number of Chinese-Australians who say foreign interference is receiving about the right amount of attention in Australia has dropped over the past year.

QUESTION Do you personally think too much, too little or about the right amount of attention is given to the issue of foreign interference by each of the following groups?





Joe Biden

Joe Biden

Relations with China & the US

Relations with China and the United States

Seven in ten Chinese-Australians (71%) see China as more of an economic partner than a security threat, with only 26% seeing China as more of a security threat. This is largely unchanged from 2021. When asked whether China will become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years, a majority (61%) say it is ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ unlikely. Only 23% of the broader Australian population indicate that China will be ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ unlikely to be a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years.

Nevertheless, more than half (53%) of Chinese-Australians regard Australia’s alliance with the United States for Australia’s security as ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ important, up five points since 2021. This is still significantly lower than the broader population of whom 87% say it is important.

Seven in ten (71%) Chinese-Australians say Australia should remain neutral in the event of a military conflict between China and the United States, compared to 51% of the broader population. Only 13% of Chinese-Australians say Australia should support the United States, and 13% say Australia should back China.

Figure 25:
China as economic partner or security threat

Most Chinese-Australians continue to see China as more of an economic partner to Australia, in contrast to the broader Australian population that see China as more of a security threat.

QUESTION In your own view, is China more of an economic partner to Australia or more of a security threat to Australia?

■ More of an economic partner to Australia
 ■ Both equally
 ■ More of a security threat to Australia
 ■ Neither
 ■ Not sure




Data for the broader Australian population is from the [2022 Lowy Institute Poll](#).

Figure 26:
Importance of the United States
alliance for Australia’s security

The majority of Chinese-Australians see Australia's alliance with the United States as important for Australia’s security, but place less importance on it than the broader Australian population.

QUESTION Thinking now about the United States. How important is Australia’s alliance relationship with the United States for Australia’s security?

Very important Fairly important Somewhat important Not at all important Not sure



Data for the broader Australian population is from the [2022 Lowy Institute Poll](#).

Figure 27:
China as a military threat

Chinese-Australians are far less likely to see China as a military threat when compared to the broader population.

QUESTION How likely do you think it is that China will become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years?

Very likely Somewhat likely Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely Not sure




Data for the broader Australian population is from the [2022 Lowy Institute Poll](#).

Figure 28:
Military conflict between China and the United States

Around seven in ten Chinese-Australians believe Australia should remain neutral in the event of a military conflict between China and the United States, a view shared by five in ten of the Australian population as a whole.

QUESTION In the event of a military conflict between China and the United States, please say which one of the following statements comes closest to your own personal view.

- Australia should support China
- Australia should remain neutral
- Australia should support the United States
- Not sure



Data for the broader Australian population is from the [2022 Lowy Institute Poll](#).

Methodology

2023 Being Chinese in Australia: Public Opinion in Chinese Communities reports the results of a national survey of 1200 adults in Australia who self-identify as of Chinese heritage. The survey was conducted between 27 September and 10 December 2022. The Social Research Centre (SRC) conducted the non-probability online survey using panel providers Multicultural Marketing and Management (MMM) and The Online Research Unit (ORU).

Chinese-Australians constitute a population that is dispersed and diverse, including recent immigrants from multiple countries with different native languages who may have difficulty completing a public opinion survey in English. Increased attention paid to Chinese-Australians by both the Australian and Chinese political classes may have also made some potential respondents more reluctant to cooperate with a survey request. Collectively, these characteristics present significant challenges to anyone wishing to survey this population.

The questionnaire was developed by the author and then refined in consultation with the SRC. The order of questions in the questionnaire was different from the order presented in this report.

The survey respondents included citizens, permanent residents and visa holders (excluding tourist visa holders) who identified as having Chinese ancestry. A total of 1721 panel members engaged with the survey and of those, 1200 (69.7%) completed the survey. Quotas based on country of birth and age were set to minimise the over-representation of younger, highly acculturated, second-generation respondents.

The sample design was representative of the Australian population of adults over the age of 18 who reported Chinese ancestry as either their first or second response to the 2021 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Census question. The profile of survey respondents was compared with ABS TableBuilder 2021 benchmarks across age, gender, location and country of birth to determine the extent, if any, of response bias.

To achieve the desired quotas, the SRC provided MMM with seven sets of links to recruit participants via six different forms of social media. Prospective respondents were asked to supply information such as gender, age and country of birth via email to allow MMM to screen for those in scope before being provided the survey link. Where a respondent had completed the 2021 survey, they were excluded by MMM. ORU were sent their own unique set of links and promoted the survey via their own panel and targeted panel members that had been pre-screened for country of birth (see Table A).

Respondents had the option to complete the questionnaire in English, Simplified Chinese or Traditional Chinese. A very high proportion chose to complete in a language other than English, with 56.5% selecting Simplified Chinese, 8.6% selecting Traditional Chinese and 34.9% completing the survey in English.

Given approximately 5.5% of the Australian population identify as of Chinese ancestry in the 2021 Census, randomly recruiting a sample of 1200 Chinese-Australians would have required interviewing and screening more than 20,000 Australians. This approach would not have been practical, and so the SRC worked with non-probability responses to build a representative sample.

To address potential bias in the sample, weighting was applied. The design weights were adjusted so that they matched external benchmarks of key demographic parameters likely to be correlated with the survey outcomes and the likelihood of response. The survey collected a range of characteristics about the respondent for which population totals can be obtained from the ABS. Having this range of data meant that we could try different model covariates with a view to aligning the weighted sample as closely as possible with the population totals for available characteristics. The final choice of covariates was determined from two considerations: minimising the bias and maximising the effective sample size (as measured by weighting efficiency).

The variables that best met the criteria for inclusion in the weight were age by education, gender, language spoken at home other than English, country of birth, and state or territory of residence (see Table B). The overall weighting efficiency is 86.1% and a margin of error of 3.0%.

To address data quality and the results being potentially biased, an IP address check was built into the survey to reject any address that was outside Australia. Quality checks around verbatims, speedsters and nonsensical or contradicting responses were also implemented.

The question regarding ‘Confidence in global leaders’ was administered differently in 2021 and 2022. In 2022, online respondents were able to select ‘never heard of the person’ or ‘don’t know’ on the first response screen. In 2021, respondents were only offered these responses if they declined to answer at the first response screen. This resulted in a significant difference in the number of respondents who said they had ‘never heard of the person’ when compared to 2021.

A question about the partnership between Australia, India, Japan and the United States (the Quad) was added to the questionnaire in 2022, with ‘not sure’ and ‘never heard of the Quad’ responses being displayed on a second screen. This differs from how data were collected for the same question in the 2022 Lowy Institute Poll (‘not sure’ and ‘never heard of the Quad’ responses displayed on the same screen). This explains the differences seen in the proportion who answered ‘not sure’ and ‘never heard of the Quad’ between surveys.

Table A: Social media channels by demographics

	Total	ORU panel	MMM panel	Community networks	Forums & online platforms	WeChat	Edu. institutes networks	Facebook networks	WhatsApp	LINE
Country of birth										
Australian born	24.1	46.3	5.8*	17.6	21.9	31.6	10.0*	0.0	42.6	44.4*
Overseas born	75.9	53.7	94.2	82.4	78.1	68.4	90.0*	100.0*	57.4	55.6*
Age group										
18-24	12.9	19.6	17.4	12.0*	5.0*	6.1*	26.7*	16.0*	5.2*	44.4*
25-44	49.6	57.5	65.6	32.4	27.9	57.9	73.3*	52.0*	55.7	0.0
45+	37.5	22.9	17.0	55.6	67.2	36.0	0.0	32.0*	39.1	55.6*

Table B: Covariates used in model for establishment weights, with population distributions

Characteristic	Benchmark target (#)	Benchmark target (%)
Age group by Highest education		
18-34 years — Bachelor degree or higher	241,869	21.54
18-34 years — Less than Bachelor degree	167,871	14.95
35-44 years — Bachelor degree or higher	169,668	15.11
35-44 years — Less than Bachelor degree	71,191	6.34
45+ years — Bachelor degree or higher	177,079	15.77
45+ years — Less than Bachelor degree	295,206	26.29
Sex		
Male	502,939	44.79
Female	619,944	55.21
Language other than English spoken at home		
No	196,505	17.5
Yes	926,378	82.5
Country of birth		
Australia	170,341	15.17
China	508,105	45.25
Other	444,325	39.57
State or Territory of residence		
New South Wales	472,285	42.06
Victoria	342,367	30.49
Queensland	130,928	11.66
South Australia	47,049	4.19
Western Australia	92,189	8.21
Tasmania	10,780	0.96
Northern Territory	5,839	0.52
Australian Capital Territory	21,335	1.9

Acknowledgements

Several questions in this report were modelled on those developed by other polling organisations, including the Pew Research Center, OmniPoll and Scanlon Foundation. Fieldwork was managed by Karly Day and Tina Petroulias of the Social Research Centre (SRC). Dr Benjamin Phillips, Andrew Ward and Jack Barton of the SRC provided design and weighting advice. John Davis of OmniPoll provided independent consulting and reviewed the questionnaire and earlier versions of the report. Natasha Kassam, formerly of the Lowy Institute, contributed to the design of the questionnaire. Ian Bruce of the Lowy Institute updated and refreshed the website interactive with contributions from Brody Smith. Richard McGregor and Sam Roggeveen of the Lowy Institute read and commented on earlier versions of the report, as did Anthony Bubalo. Jack Sato of the Lowy Institute provided data checking assistance. Clare Caldwell of the Lowy Institute copyedited the report.

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Tables

Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Table 1: Australia as a place to live

Overall, how would you rate Australia as a place to live?

	2020	2021	2022
Very good	45	42	51
Good	32	41	41
Total: Very good/good	77	83	92
Average	20	15	7
Poor	2	2	0
Very poor	0	0	0
Total: Poor/Very poor	2	2	0

Table 2: Pride in Australian life and culture

To what extent do you take pride in the Australian way of life and culture?

	2020	2021	2022
To a great extent	45	22	27
To a moderate extent	39	49	47
Total: To a great extent/moderate extent	84	71	74
Only slightly	13	25	23
Not at all	2	4	2
Total: Only slightly/not at all	15	29	25
Not sure/prefer not to say	1	0	1

Table 3: Views on democracy

Please say which one of the three statements comes closest to your own personal views about democracy.

	2020	2021	2022
Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government	36	34	48
In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable	41	45	36
For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have	22	21	15
Not sure/Prefer not to say	1	0	1

Table 4: Self-identification

Overall, do you think yourself as...?

Chinese-Australian	41
Chinese	32
Australian-Chinese	18
Australian	5
None of the above	3

Table 5: Sense of belonging

And to what extent do you have a sense of belonging to... (ranked by total indicating 'to a great extent' and 'to a moderate extent')

	To a great extent			To a moderate extent			Total: To a great/moderate extent			Only slightly			Not at all			Total: Only slightly/not at all		
	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022
Australia	26	17	22	45	47	53	71	64	75	26	31	22	2	5	2	28	36	24
Your local community	23	16	20	46	45	47	69	61	67	24	33	30	6	6	3	30	39	33
Chinese people	29	32	22	39	37	44	68	69	66	25	25	26	8	6	9	33	31	35
China	23	24	18	42	38	38	65	62	56	25	27	27	10	11	16	35	38	43

Table 6.0: Personal experience of discrimination

For each of the following, please indicate if you have, or have not, personally experienced it in the last 12 months in Australia?

	People have treated you differently or less favourably because you are of Chinese heritage			Someone expressed support for you because you are of Chinese heritage			You have been called offensive names because you are of Chinese heritage			You have been physically threatened or attacked because you are of Chinese heritage		
	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022
Yes, has happened to me in the last 12 months	37	34	35	40	33	33	31	25	21	18	18	14
No, has not happened to me in the last 12 months	63	66	65	60	67	67	69	75	79	82	82	86

Table 6.1: Personal experience of discrimination – by age group and country of birth

For each of the following, please indicate if you have, or have not, personally experienced it in the last 12 months in Australia?

	People have treated you differently or less favourably because you are of Chinese heritage			Someone expressed support for you because you are of Chinese heritage			You have been called offensive names because you are of Chinese heritage			You have been physically threatened or attacked because you are of Chinese heritage		
	Yes, has happened to me in the last 12 months											
Age: 18-29	38			36			28			16		
Age: 30-44	38			33			21			15		
Age: 45-59	33			32			16			13		
Age 60 & over	26			26			23			11		
COB: Australia	38			38			30			20		
COB: China, Hong Kong, Macau	35			32			19			14		

Table 7: Social media usage and frequency

Thinking about the social media sites you use. About how often do you visit or use...

(Ranked by total of 'several times a day' and 'once a day')

	Several times a day	About once a day	Total: Several times a day/once a day	A few times a week	Every few weeks	Total: A few times week/every few weeks	Less often	Never	Prefer not to say
YouTube	35	23	58	20	9	29	7	4	3
Facebook	31	18	49	15	13	28	10	11	2
WeChat	36	11	47	11	10	21	15	15	3
Instagram	22	16	38	16	11	27	12	21	3
TikTok/Douyin	14	12	26	13	9	22	12	37	3
Twitter	11	14	25	13	12	25	14	33	3
LINE	7	10	17	10	8	18	11	49	4
Weibo	6	10	16	12	11	23	21	39	3
Other*	4	2	6	3	3	6	6	51	31

*Xiaohongshu or Little Red Book is the most frequently used 'other' social media site as determined by 'several times a day'

Table 8.0: WeChat and English-language news

And now thinking about WeChat in particular. Please indicate if you use WeChat often, sometimes or never to get your English-language news.

	2020	2021	2022
Often	13	15	11
Sometimes	51	48	47
Total: Often/sometimes	64	63	58
Never	36	37	38
Not sure/Prefer not to say	1	0	5

Table 8.1: WeChat and Chinese-language news

And please indicate if you use WeChat often, sometimes or never to get your Chinese-language news.

	2020	2021	2022
Often	34	36	25
Sometimes	50	50	50
Total: Often/sometimes	84	86	75
Never	16	14	19
Not sure/Prefer not to say	1	0	5

Table 9: Australian media reporting about China

Overall, would you say Australian media reporting about China is...

	2020	2021	2022
Too negative	50	57	42
Too positive	19	9	13
Fair and balanced	31	33	42
Not sure/Prefer not to say	0	1	3

Table 10: Trust in sources of information

How much do you trust the following sources to report news accurately and fairly?
(ranked by total indicating 'a great deal' and 'somewhat')

	A great deal		Somewhat		Total: a great deal/ somewhat		Not very much		Not at all/ not sure		Total: not at all/ not very much/not sure	
	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022
English-language media outlets in Australia	14	23	57	53	71	76	21	21	7	3	28	24
Chinese-language media outlets in Australia	8	14	53	50	61	64	32	29	7	7	39	36
Chinese-language media outlets in China	9	9	47	46	56	55	32	32	12	13	44	45
News that is shared on WeChat Official Accounts	6	6	43	40	49	46	35	37	16	17	51	54

Table 11: 2022 Federal election

During the federal election held on Saturday 21 May 2022, did you see any stories about politics or the election that seemed completely made-up news?

Yes	27
No	68
Not sure	5

Table 12: Made-up news

How confident are you in your own ability to recognise news that is made-up news?

Very confident	10
Somewhat confident	54
Total: confident	64
Not very confident	30
Not at all confident	4
Total: not confident	34
Not sure	3

Table 13: Made-up news and taking action

Has the issue of made-up news and information led you to do any of the following?

	Yes, have done this	No, have not done this
Check the facts of news stories yourself	53	47
Stop getting news from a specific outlet	54	46
Change the way you use social media	46	54
Reduce the amount of news you get overall	45	54
Report or flag a story that you think is made-up	34	66

Table 14.0: Trust in major powers

How much do you trust the following countries or territories to act responsibly in the world?
(ranked by total who trust 'a great deal' and 'somewhat')

	A great deal			Somewhat			Total: a great deal/ somewhat			Not very much			Not at all			Total: not very much/not at all		
	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022
Australia	27	20	27	47	48	48	74	68	75	23	27	20	2	6	5	25	33	25
United Kingdom	-	16	13	-	49	49	--	65	62	-	30	31	-	6	7	-	36	38
China	22	22	16	50	45	45	72	67	61	21	26	28	7	7	12	28	33	40
Taiwan	-	15	11	-	36	43	-	51	54	-	33	35	-	16	11	-	49	46
Hong Kong	-	12	10	-	42	44	-	54	54	-	35	37	-	11	10	-	46	47
United States	13	13	13	44	38	40	57	51	53	34	35	35	9	14	12	43	49	47
Japan	14	13	13	40	42	38	54	55	51	39	32	38	7	13	10	46	45	48
Indonesia	-	9	5	-	27	32	-	36	37	-	45	48	-	18	15	-	63	63
Russia	-	9	5	-	36	32	-	45	37	-	40	39	-	14	24	-	54	63
India	8	9	5	33	25	27	41	34	32	43	41	50	16	25	18	59	66	68

Table 14.1 Trust in major powers

How much do you trust the following countries or territories to act responsibly in the world?
(ranked by total percentage of Chinese-Australians who trust 'a great deal' and 'somewhat')
(Comparison between Being Chinese in Australia [BCIA] 2022 and Lowy Institute Poll ([LI] 2022)

	A great deal		Somewhat		Total: a great deal/ somewhat		Not very much		Not at all		Total: not very much/not at all	
	CA*	AP*	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP
United Kingdom	13	29	49	58	62	87	31	10	7	3	38	13
China	16	2	45	10	61	12	28	39	12	48	40	87
United States	13	16	40	49	53	65	35	26	12	9	47	35
Japan	13	27	38	60	51	87	38	10	10	3	48	13
Indonesia	5	4	32	47	37	51	48	40	15	9	63	49
Russia	5	1	32	4	37	5	39	17	24	77	63	84
India	5	5	27	51	32	56	50	35	18	8	68	43

*CA = Chinese-Australians

*AP = Australian population

Table 15.0: Trust in political leaders

For each, please indicate how much confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs — a lot of confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence or no confidence at all. (ranked by total saying ‘a lot’ and ‘some’ confidence)

(Comparison between BCIA 2022 and LI 2022)

	A lot		Some		Total: a lot/some confidence		Not too much		None at all		Total: not too much/none at all		Not sure who the person is		Not sure	
	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP
Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese	18	-	42	-	60	-	22	-	7	-	29	-	5	-	6	-
New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern*	13	58	36	29	49	87	22	6	13	5	35	11	9	1	7	1
Chinese President Xi Jinping	11	2	31	9	42	11	23	26	24	56	47	82	5	3	6	4
French President Emmanuel Macron	7	15	30	52	37	67	32	17	13	6	45	23	10	5	10	5
US President Joe Biden	6	13	28	45	34	58	34	26	21	14	55	40	5	0	6	2
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy	9	-	23	-	32	-	28	-	23	-	51	-	9	-	9	-
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen	7	-	25	-	32	-	30	-	23	-	53	-	7	-	8	-
Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee Ka-chiu	5	-	26	-	31	-	28	-	21	-	49	-	13	-	8	-
Russian President Vladimir Putin	6	2	23	4	29	6	26	9	32	83	58	92	6	0	7	2
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida	5	14	24	51	29	65	31	12	17	3	48	15	13	10	10	10
Australian Opposition leader Peter Dutton	5	-	20	-	25	-	28	-	28	-	56	-	11	-	8	-
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un	3	2	14	3	17	5	28	12	40	80	68	92	8	1	7	2

*The survey was in the field prior to Jacinda Ardern announcing her resignation on 19 January 2023.

Table 15.1: Trust in political leaders

For each, please indicate how much confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs — a lot of confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence or no confidence at all. (ranked by total saying ‘a lot’ and ‘some’ confidence)

(Comparison between BCIA 2021 and BCIA 2022)

	A lot		Some		Total: a lot/some confidence		Not too much		None at all		Total: not too much/none at all		Not sure who the person is		Not sure	
	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022
New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern*	22	13	46	36	68	49	26	22	6	13	32	35	0	9	0	7
Chinese President Xi Jinping	24	11	41	31	65	42	26	23	10	24	36	47	0	5	0	6
US President Joe Biden	11	6	31	28	42	34	42	34	15	21	57	55	0	5	0	6
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen	15	7	28	25	43	32	30	30	27	23	57	53	0	7	0	8
Russian President Vladimir Putin	16	6	35	23	51	29	35	26	14	32	49	58	0	6	0	7
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un	11	3	22	14	33	17	35	28	33	40	68	68	0	8	0	7

Table 16.0: Threats to vital Australian interests

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interests of Australia in the next ten years. Do you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all? (ranked by percentage saying ‘a critical threat’)

	Critical threat			An important but not critical threat			Total: critical threat/important threat			Not an important threat at all		
	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022
A severe downturn in the global economy	41	49	49	49	41	41	90	90	90	10	10	10
Australia–China relations	-	51	37	-	37	48	-	88	85	-	12	15
Foreign interference in Australian politics	29	35	36	59	46	50	88	81	86	12	19	14
A military conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan	32	37	36	49	45	49	81	82	85	19	17	15
Political instability in the United States	-	-	35	-	-	51	-	-	86	-	-	14
Covid-19 and other potential epidemics	51	56	35	39	34	49	90	90	84	10	10	16
Climate change	30	43	35	56	41	46	86	84	81	14	16	19
The dissemination of false information or fake news	40	39	32	46	47	54	86	86	86	14	15	14
Cyberattacks from other countries	36	29	32	48	50	52	84	79	84	17	21	16
China’s foreign policy	-	-	28	-	-	53	-	-	81	-	-	19
North Korea’s nuclear program	-	25	27	-	47	52	-	72	79	-	28	22
Russia’s foreign policy	-	-	25	-	-	56	-	-	81	-	-	19

Table 16.1: Threats to vital Australian interests

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interests of Australia in the next ten years. Do you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all? (ranked by percentage of Chinese-Australians saying 'a critical threat')

(Comparison between BCIA 2022 and LI 2022)

	Critical threat		An important but not critical threat		Total: critical threat/important threat		Not an important threat at all		Not sure/Don't know	
	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP
A severe downturn in the global economy	49	55	41	42	90	87	10	3	0	0
Australia–China relations	37	-	48	-	85	-	15	-	0	-
Foreign interference in Australian politics	36	49	50	45	86	94	14	6	0	0
A military conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan	36	64	49	32	85	96	15	4	0	0
Political instability in the United States	35	34	51	56	86	90	14	9	0	0
Covid-19 and other potential epidemics	35	42	49	48	84	90	16	9	0	0
Climate change	35	62	46	27	81	89	19	11	0	0
The dissemination of false information or fake news	32	-	54	-	86	-	14	-	0	-
Cyberattacks from other countries	32	64	52	33	84	97	16	3	0	0
China's foreign policy	28	65	53	32	81	97	19	3	0	1
North Korea's nuclear program	27	58	52	35	79	93	22	7	0	0
Russia's foreign policy	25	68	56	26	81	94	19	5	0	0

Table 17: Concern about world events: Russia and China

Now thinking about world events. To what extent are you concerned or not concerned about... (ranked by total percentage of Chinese-Australians saying 'very' and 'somewhat' concerned)

(Comparison between BCIA 2022 and LI 2022)

	Very Concerned		Somewhat concerned		Total: concerned		Not too concerned		Not at all concerned		Total: not concerned		Not sure	
	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP
Russia's invasion of Ukraine	15	69	45	23	60	92	33	4	7	3	40	7	0	0
China potentially opening a military base in a Pacific Island country	15	60	32	28	57	88	37	9	15	3	52	12	0	1
China–Russia cooperation	13	56	34	31	47	87	40	9	14	4	0	13	0	0
India–Russia cooperation	8	28	35	44	43	72	42	22	15	6	0	28	0	0

Table 18: AUKUS

Thinking now about Australia's partnerships in the world. Do you think AUKUS, the security partnership between Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom, will make...

(Comparison between BCIA 2022 and LI 2022)

	More safe		Less safe		Makes no difference		Never heard of AUKUS		Not sure	
	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP
Australia	27	52	26	7	26	22	15	8	6	11
Our region	24	49	25	8	29	24	14	8	7	11

Table 19: The Quad

Do you think the Quad, the partnership between Australia, India, Japan and the United States, will make...

(Comparison between BCIA 2022 and LI 2022)

	More safe		Less safe		Makes no difference		Never heard of the Quad		Not sure	
	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP
Australia	33	53	34	4	32	20	0	12	0	10
Our region	33	52	35	5	32	21	0	12	0	11

Table 20: Use of Australian military forces

There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using Australian military forces in other parts of the world. Please give your opinion about the following situations. Would you personally be in favour or against the use of Australian military forces ... (ranked by percentage of Chinese-Australians saying 'in favour')

(Comparison between BCIA 2022 and LI 2022)

	In favour		Against		Neither in favour nor against		Not sure	
	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP
To stop a government from committing genocide and killing large numbers of its own people	63	79	37	19	0	1	0	2
To restore law and order in a Pacific nation	59	75	41	23	0	0	0	1
To fight against violent extremist groups in the Middle East	53	41	47	57	0	1	0	1
To conduct freedom of navigation naval operations in the South China Sea and other disputed areas claimed by China	41	60	59	38	0	0	0	2
If China invaded Taiwan and the United States decided to intervene	36	51	64	47	0	1	0	2
If Russia invaded one of its neighbours	35	40	65	58	0	1	0	2

Table 21: Contact with the Chinese embassy or consulate

Over the last 12 months, how often, if at all, have you had any contact with the Chinese embassy or consulate in your state or territory?

(Comparison between BCIA 2020, 2021, 2022)

	2020	2021	2022
Regularly	2	4	2
Occasionally	14	14	13
Total: Regularly/Occasionally	16	18	15
Once or twice	39	23	28
Not at all	45	59	54
Not sure/Prefer not to say	0	0	3

Table 22: Interaction with Chinese organisations

Over the last 12 months, how often, if at all, have you had any interaction with Chinese community and cultural organisations?

(Comparison between BCIA 2020, 2021, 2022)

	2020	2021	2022
At least once a week	7	7	6
About once a month	18	14	15
Total: At least once a week/about once a month	25	21	21
Every few months	26	23	25
Once or twice	21	26	21
Total: Every few months/once or twice	47	49	46
Never	28	29	28
Not sure/prefer not to say	0	0	4

Table 23.0: Foreign influence in Australian political processes

Are you personally concerned or not concerned about the influence of each of the following countries on Australia’s political processes?

	Yes, concerned			No, not concerned		
	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022
United States	33	36	62	67	64	38
China	46	50	54	54	51	46
Japan	55	53	43	45	47	56
India	54	55	38	46	45	62

Table 23.1: Foreign influence in Australian political processes

Are you personally concerned or not concerned about the influence of each of the following countries on Australia’s political processes?

(Comparison between BCIA 2022 and LI 2022)

	Yes, concerned		No, not concerned		Not sure/Don’t know	
	CA	AP	CA	AP	CA	AP
United States	62	54	38	45	0	1
China	54	86	46	13	0	1

Table 24: Amount of attention on foreign interference

Do you personally think too much, too little or about the right amount of attention is given to the issue of foreign interference by each of the following groups?

	Too much attention			Too little attention			About the right amount			Prefer not to say/not sure		
	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022
Politicians	44	31	43	30	19	28	26	50	29	0	0	0
Media	45	34	40	28	16	25	27	50	35	0	0	0
Public	30	19	27	39	23	38	31	58	35	0	0	0

Table 25: China as economic partner or security threat

In your own view, is China more of an economic partner to Australia or more of a security threat to Australia?

(Comparison between BCIA 2020, 2021, 2022 and LI 2020, 2021, 2022)

	Chinese-Australian			Australian population		
	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022
More of an economic partner to Australia	66	73	71	55	34	33
More of a security threat to Australia	34	27	26	41	63	63
Both equally	0	0	1	3	1	3
Neither/Not sure	0	1	2	1	1	1

Table 26: Importance of the United States alliance for Australia's security

Thinking now about the United States. How important is Australia's alliance relationship with the United States for Australia's security?

(Comparison between BCIA 2021, 2022 and LI 2021, 2022)

	Chinese-Australian		Australian population	
	2021	2022	2021	2022
Very important	12	16	47	60
Fairly important	36	37	31	27
Total: Very/fairly important	48	53	78	87
Somewhat important	42	37	20	11
Not at all important	10	8	2	2
Not sure	1	3	0	0

Table 27: China as a military threat

How likely do you think it is that China will become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years?
(Comparison between BCIA 2022 and LI 2022)

	Chinese-Australian	Australian population
Very likely	6	32
Somewhat likely	30	43
Total: likely	36	75
Somewhat unlikely	40	17
Very unlikely	21	6
Total: unlikely	61	23
Not sure	4	1

Table 28: Military conflict between China and the United States

In the event of a military conflict between China and the United States, please say which one of the following statements comes closest to your own personal view.
(Comparison between BCIA 2021, 2022 and LI 2021, 2022)

	Chinese-Australian		Australian population	
	2021	2022	2021	2022
Australia should remain neutral	74	71	57	51
Australia should support China	14	13	1	1
Australia should support the United States	11	13	41	46
Not sure/Don't know	1	4	1	2

20 | **LOWY**
YEARS | **INSTITUTE**